Chinese in a nutcracker on Ukraine?

One of the most curious developments around the Ukrainian crisis has been the Chinese response to it. The Middle Kingdom is usually quite reticent in joining issues on affairs that it is not directly involved in. But in this case, quite curiously China seemed to be quite vocal in pledging support to Russia. While it abstained in the UN Security Council resolution yesterday, a bit of a blow-back to its usual stance on such issues, the general narratives have been quite supportive of Russia.

Now, Russia and China are not natural allies. Not by a long shot. Besides having fought a border war in 1969, one of the abiding concerns of demographically declining Russia is the vulnerability of its sparsely populated Eastern frontiers to Chinese aggression.

In this case though, China and Russia are joined in being leery of "colour revolutions", ostensibly sponsored by the West. But this is more than just a regime change affair. In the case of Ukraine, the story unfolding is also of one state (Russia) encouraging a region (Crimea) of another state (Ukraine) to break off, citing largely ethnic reasons. For China the principle being established is hugely problematic, as this gives credibility to what China terms as "splitist" tendencies in Tibet and Xinjiang. Both have uncanny parallels to Crimea - regions populated by ethnic minorities (Indic Buddhists in Tibet and Uighur muslims in Xinjiang) claiming to be persecuted by the national majority and state. If Crimea has a right to break-off using a referendum, why shouldnt Tibet? Or Xinjiang?

This is where the red line emerges for China. Much as it dislikes Western sponsorship of colour revolutions, it would be suicidal to side with the Russians in this case.

There is one more, not insignificant issue. Ukraine has been a major supplier to the Chinese defence industrial complex, especially in terms of IP of critical Soviet technologies. Bulk of the aeroengines in new Chinese aircraft, for example trace their origins to Ukrainian assistance.

India has the same issue - it will be difficult to endorse Russian action in Crimea without being set up for uncomfortable questions on Kashmir. Hence, the silence of India on the affair is undertstandable.

But the vocal nature of the Chinese hasnt been, and maybe the nutcracker is creating a bit of a climbdown now. But all around Asia, there would be lessons learnt on the China's behaviour.

Ukraine - plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose

Essentially, more things change more they remain the same! The recent fracas (yes, as of now its still only at the stage of a fracas) in Ukraine re-establishes the old dictums of high power play. A few pointers are in order.

One, Ukraine isnt Finland, though that is precisely the instance that even the great sage, Henry Kissinger gave in his analysis yesterday. Simply put, Finland doesnt have a large minority of ethnic Russians in their midst!

Two, Crimea isnt just another plot of neighbouring land for Russia. Sevastopol is the only warm weather port that Russia has. For a large, and largely landlocked country, access to a warm weather port has been a multi-generation endeavour for Russian rulers starting from Peter the great. It would be quite naive for a modern day Peter (Putin) to give that up.

Three, Western outrage over democracy et al are, to put it mildly, quite irrelevant to the situation. Such outrage rhetoric often gets mistaken for capability or intent for action. But as the Hungarian partisans in 1956, or Alexander Dubcek (of Czechoslovakia) in 1964, or indeed the Chechen rebels in the '90s found out, rhetoric over human rights, democracy etc isnt the same as putting one of the super carriers into the Mediterranean for action!

For the Ukrainians, unfortunately the choice is between rock and a hard place. It can either allow Crimea to be their Sudetenland. Or they can try and evolve a modus vivendi with Russia, with an Alsace-Lorraine type arrangement on Crimea. As Kissinger rightly recognises, the Ukrainians have little history of governing themselves - till 1991 they had been ruled by various assortments of Russian rulers for nearly 500 years. they havent finessed the art of negotiating with a stronger power without breaking into a major confrontation.

It is here that the West needs to help. There is some talk of the US launching a "gas war" against Russia, using its new-found shale reserves. Laughable proposition, given by people unaware of or unwilling to look at the basics of gas economics. Russia supplies gas to Ukraine and rest of Europe through a pipeline (owned by Gazprom!). For the US to supply gas to Europe across the Atlantic would require the same to be transported in large LNG tankers. the price of piped gas is about a third that of shipped gas. the idea of a contest is about the same as an Indian I-League club trying its skills against an EPL club!

Instead of such Quixotic ideas, West can lend its skills in negotiations to the Ukrainians, while maintaining a level of diplomatic pressure on Russia, so that a balanced modus vivendi can be arrived at.

How that can be done, and when - we will see in the next few weeks.

Indo-Japanese engagement - the only pivot of Asia?

Over the last decade, there has been a lot of chatter in the international strategic circles about the so-called Asian pivot in US foreign policy. The shape of that pivot has been imagined at various levels - the Sino-US G2 grouping, the trilaternal Indo-US-Japan or even the quadrilateral Indo-US-Aus-Japan "blocs". However, two developments have put paid to most of the assumptions. One, an increasingly inward looking US posture over the last decade - a lot of people missed the latest round of major cuts in US defence budgets. Two, the rapid rise of China as the second largest politico-military power in the world, importantly someone with no evangelical enthusiasm on its ideology (which means it poses no threat to the American homeland, or even its "near abroad".)

Consequently, rest of Asia has to fend for itself while dealing with an increasingly assertive and aggressive China. Contrary to the propaganda, China has territorial disputes pending with many of its neighbours - Japan, Vietnam, Russia and of course, India. China's enormous trade heft too automatically causes friction with large parts of mercantile Asia (ASEAN).

In this context, the only initiative of heft and context that is emerging is the Indo-Japan engagement. Interestingly, a lot of the heavy lifting in this case has come from Japan. Note the following developments:

1. Shinzo Abe, in his recent visit to India, signed a deal to sell the Japanese US2 amphibious aircraft to India. For those who missed the point, the "pacifist", post-WWII Japan has had a stated policy of not exporting any military hardware. In terms of its impact on changing internal political calculus, this is almost as big as George W Bush breaking the "non proliferation consensus" in US policy during the Indo-US nuclear deal.

2. Last year, while the rupee went on a tailspin on the back of the tapering announcement by the US Fed, the big backstop came in the form of a Japanese currency swap agreement, worth 50 billion dollars. What it meant was that India had access to 50 billion dollars of Japanese reserves in case it wanted to. This, along with a slew of other measures restored stability in the currency. Though India has had to swap a single dollar yet from this arrangement, the impact on sentiment has been decisive, partly responsible for the rupee being the best performing emerging market currency this year!

This is just a start. Obviously, the Shinzo Abe led government (Shinzo Abe's grandfather, enjoyed great relations with Jawaharlal Nehru and India in his time as PM) is investing a lot in the Indian relationship. The reason is simple, India is the only state with the requisite military and economic heft in Asia to be able to be able to be a "swing state" in any face-off with China. All other Asian states are either too small, or too weak (militarily) or too poor or indeed too beholden to China to offer meaningful support in such a vneture.

It would be up to the new government in Delhi to grasp this relationship with both hands and some more, and take it to a new level. Most of the actionables immediately of course, would be internal!
 

A newer, more frightening reality of Assam?

In the entire debate of whether the Assam riots are an ethnic issue, a communal one or indeed an insider-foreigner clash, an extremely important point has gotten missed out in the narrative. In the last 7-10 days, we have had (muslim) mobs vandalising police and media in Mumbai, the Buddha statue in Lucknow, and carrying out (relatviely) minor violent demonstrations in many other parts. All of them protesting Assam and Burma(!), weaving them inside a larger narrative of muslim grievances.



It has put paid to almost all narratives - from BJP's "foreigner" thesis to the nuanced secular "complex Assamese identities" treatise. The overwhelming narrative that gets crystallised is frightening. Its about the reality of "pan Islamism". India has seen that over many issues - periodic Shia displays of angst over US policies on Iran, or the virulence displayed over the Danish cartoons recently - but these have been sporadic and episodic. But the latest round of violence has displayed, chillingly, that on certain issues, the ummah prevails over the local community and worse, even an "Indian" identity.



So the Buddha statue in Lucknow is fair game because there are (real or imagined is besides teh point) Rohingya muslim grievance against Burmese buddhists.



This, rather than quibbles over who is Indian and who isnt, is the worrying point.

Non Alignment 2.0

A new study in an attempt to discern "strategic" patterns in Indian policy making..

http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf

UNSC - India already belongs?

One of the prime foreign policy objectives in recent years for India has been that of a permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In a marked deviation from the usual ad hocism that bedevils policy in India, the quest for UNSC has been a multi-decadal, focused initiative. So much so that Barack Obama had to make public "commitments" (of sorts) of support in order to make his India visit a "success".


The question often asked of India though, including by the US President during his visit, is whether India is ready to sit on the high table? Is India prepared to make tough policy choices, rather than sitting on the sidelines and focus on the rhetoric rather than the hard politics?


There are no easy answers to the question, but one approach that has not been studied too carefully perhaps is India's track record as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. How has India voted? Have we remained on the sidelines on the burning issues of the day? Or have we stuck to a single-minded focus on India's strategic interests? Indeed, how has our stand been in contrast to the other great Asian nation state, China, during the same periods?


A study of India's two latest stints in UNSC, 2011-12 and 1991-92, throws up some interesting conclusions.


2011-12
In India's latest stint in UNSC, the council presented a divided stance on 6 occasions, 5 if one excludes the resolution on non-proliferation by Iran which was carried unanimously save Lebanon which abstained. These 5 resolutions involved issues that spanned a wide swathe of geopolitical challenges - from Syria to Somalia to Libya to Israel. India's stance in most of these cases were congruent with the "Western" school, even as the West came to be increasingly confronted by an increasingly assertive China.

On the question of Syria, India made its case clearly, even if seemingly hesitantly in favour of the "spring" there, voting with the US/West once while abstaining on another occasion, while China (and Russia) vetoed the resolution on both occasions.

On Somalia, despite India's large and increasing economic engagement in Africa, India was quite clear in siding with the Western world in asking the Somalian leadership for greater accountability in protecting its citizens. This, in the face of China, India's main competitor for economic influence in Africa, abstaining (along with Russia).

It was only on questions related to Libya that India made common cause with the BRIC bloc, and abstained when Europe (supported by the US) wanted to push for a more aggressive intervention there.

India's stance on Israeli settlements in Jerusalem was a clear Yes, along with the rest of the world, barring the US which maintained its traditional veto on matters relating to Israel.

In a nutshell, out of 6 resolutions in UNSC that presented a divided vote, India took a clear position in 4 out of them, while abstaining in 2. China on the other hand, abstained on 2 occasions as well, while using its veto clearly on the Syrian issue twice. Beyond the bare numbers, the principles used are key. India went ahead and made a stance on larger principles on both Syria and Somalia, while China interventions were purely in line with commercial interests in both cases.

1991-92
But somewhat more interesting to analyse would be India's engagements in its previous stint in UNSC, in 1991-92. Unlike an identified emerging giant today, the early '90s were traumatic for the republic in many ways. The economy was in tatters, buffeted by the socialist excesses coming to roost. On the other hand, the previously cosy strategic praxis was rudely shaken up by the break-up of the Soviet Union and loud proclamations of the "End of History" in favour of the Americans. To top it all, India's big strategic achilis heel, Kashmir, erupted in a bloody insurgency.

At the same time, the challenges confronting the world were interestingly new - break up of traditional political unities in Europe, overturning of the communist regimes in Asia and Africa, post Gulf War I rumblings in the Middle East. And many of these involved political dispensations with traditional friendly linkages with India.

First the numbers. Out of 12 resolutions that divided the UNSC, India abstained in 4. In contrast, China abstained in 8. On issues relating to Cambodia and Iraq, India was firmly behind the World consensus, while China refused to take a stance. Even on the developments in Bosnia, India went along with the humanitarian imperatives most of the time, abstaining only on mandates basically authorising military force. It is only on sanctions against Libya that India baulked completely, and abstained from being part of the move.

The numbers and context are interesting. Despite multiple challenges, in 1991-92 India stuck to a certain datum level in its responses, ie, one of an orderly shift in the world order as it changed. Therefore, incremental measures against Iraq were supported as they looked to further the cause of removing the threat of war in the middle east. The change in Cambodia away from its brutal past was supported as well. World actions to tackle the genocide in former Yugoslavia was supported too, though India stopped short of endorsing decisive military action. Maybe that was part of India's "growing up" process, maybe it was just too much of a leap of faith in a post-non aligned world. But at the very least, India's stance compared very very favourably indeed to that of China. In terms of presenting a strategic and moral praxis, and sticking to it, it was a record that brings no shame.

In short, India already "belongs" there. Despite the sometimes breathless commentaries on immediate events, the long term trend on India's actions are that of a consistent and emerging international posture, and one that changes too, as times change. India is ready, the question really is, whether the rest of the world is!

The Iran conundrum – Indian choices predicated on the wrong premise?

There has been the usual flurry of commentary from the commentariat in the latest round of tension around Iran. Not incorrectly, much of it has been focused on how India cannot be sitting on the sidelines, as it were anymore. It is when the analyses dive a little deeper do the nasty little nuances show up, angularities that dont fit the narrative. There are fundamentally two reasons quoted why India needs to maintain equanimity with Iran:
1. India imports 12 million tons of crude oil from that country.2. Presence of a large Indian diaspora in the region and the remittances from there.
Problem is, the first issue is hardly one of any great import. Oil is a global commodity, and prices are determined globally. Iran isnt the only country producing crude, and absence of Iranian supplies does not make either US or Western Europe, both larger consumers of crude than India, particularly oil-distressed. India therefore, should be able to replace its Iranian supplies with alternate sources relatively easily. Especially with the Saudis being ever so eager to make those deals.
The second, on the other hand is even more “interesting”. Bulk of the Indian diaspora in the Middle East is concentrated in the GCC region. Iran on the other hand, has very few Indian expats and contributes very little indeed to remittances. And countries that bring up the forefront of the global wariness on Iran are not US, or even Israel. The GCC bloc, led by the Saudis have the highest axes to grind and are working doubly hard in back channels to mobilise support for isloating Iran in world capitals. Again, if India are to be pursuing “self interest” single mindedly, we should be ideally be cutting deals with the Saudis!
Surprisingly, there is a third, and in many ways, the most important angle that very few have focussed on. Which is the fact that Iran constitutes the pivot of India’s Afghan strategy. For all the years of Taliban rule, Iran was the geographic praxis for India to retain its influence in the region. The Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, built by India, is part of the larger Indo-Afghan route whose first leg is Indian access to the Chabahaar port in Iran. With the Americans scheduled to leave sooner rather than later, the Iranian geography would be nearly irreplaceable for India to retain strategic options.
In short, are India’s options really that “Hobson”-ian? Or is there a case of Iran needing friends, or at least neutrals more than India’s strategic imperatives? Imaginatively thought through, given India’s equity with Israel as well as with the Saudis, is there space for India to emerge as a mediator? Cant we tell Iran that while we are happy to keep half a foot outside the Western-GCC axis, there has to be a price to be paid for that? There was a time when India actively sought to “mediate”, whether in Korea or in Indo-China. Then it was primarily about our “moral heft”, an equity that had rapidly diminishing returns. Today, as a major strategic partner for all parties involved, and without the suspicions that China almost congenitally evokes in most capitals, India’s options are more.
This is the time to create new options, not lament the lack of them!