Tuesday, February 28, 2012

UNSC - India already belongs?

One of the prime foreign policy objectives in recent years for India has been that of a permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In a marked deviation from the usual ad hocism that bedevils policy in India, the quest for UNSC has been a multi-decadal, focused initiative. So much so that Barack Obama had to make public "commitments" (of sorts) of support in order to make his India visit a "success".


The question often asked of India though, including by the US President during his visit, is whether India is ready to sit on the high table? Is India prepared to make tough policy choices, rather than sitting on the sidelines and focus on the rhetoric rather than the hard politics?


There are no easy answers to the question, but one approach that has not been studied too carefully perhaps is India's track record as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. How has India voted? Have we remained on the sidelines on the burning issues of the day? Or have we stuck to a single-minded focus on India's strategic interests? Indeed, how has our stand been in contrast to the other great Asian nation state, China, during the same periods?


A study of India's two latest stints in UNSC, 2011-12 and 1991-92, throws up some interesting conclusions.


2011-12
In India's latest stint in UNSC, the council presented a divided stance on 6 occasions, 5 if one excludes the resolution on non-proliferation by Iran which was carried unanimously save Lebanon which abstained. These 5 resolutions involved issues that spanned a wide swathe of geopolitical challenges - from Syria to Somalia to Libya to Israel. India's stance in most of these cases were congruent with the "Western" school, even as the West came to be increasingly confronted by an increasingly assertive China.

On the question of Syria, India made its case clearly, even if seemingly hesitantly in favour of the "spring" there, voting with the US/West once while abstaining on another occasion, while China (and Russia) vetoed the resolution on both occasions.

On Somalia, despite India's large and increasing economic engagement in Africa, India was quite clear in siding with the Western world in asking the Somalian leadership for greater accountability in protecting its citizens. This, in the face of China, India's main competitor for economic influence in Africa, abstaining (along with Russia).

It was only on questions related to Libya that India made common cause with the BRIC bloc, and abstained when Europe (supported by the US) wanted to push for a more aggressive intervention there.

India's stance on Israeli settlements in Jerusalem was a clear Yes, along with the rest of the world, barring the US which maintained its traditional veto on matters relating to Israel.

In a nutshell, out of 6 resolutions in UNSC that presented a divided vote, India took a clear position in 4 out of them, while abstaining in 2. China on the other hand, abstained on 2 occasions as well, while using its veto clearly on the Syrian issue twice. Beyond the bare numbers, the principles used are key. India went ahead and made a stance on larger principles on both Syria and Somalia, while China interventions were purely in line with commercial interests in both cases.

1991-92
But somewhat more interesting to analyse would be India's engagements in its previous stint in UNSC, in 1991-92. Unlike an identified emerging giant today, the early '90s were traumatic for the republic in many ways. The economy was in tatters, buffeted by the socialist excesses coming to roost. On the other hand, the previously cosy strategic praxis was rudely shaken up by the break-up of the Soviet Union and loud proclamations of the "End of History" in favour of the Americans. To top it all, India's big strategic achilis heel, Kashmir, erupted in a bloody insurgency.

At the same time, the challenges confronting the world were interestingly new - break up of traditional political unities in Europe, overturning of the communist regimes in Asia and Africa, post Gulf War I rumblings in the Middle East. And many of these involved political dispensations with traditional friendly linkages with India.

First the numbers. Out of 12 resolutions that divided the UNSC, India abstained in 4. In contrast, China abstained in 8. On issues relating to Cambodia and Iraq, India was firmly behind the World consensus, while China refused to take a stance. Even on the developments in Bosnia, India went along with the humanitarian imperatives most of the time, abstaining only on mandates basically authorising military force. It is only on sanctions against Libya that India baulked completely, and abstained from being part of the move.

The numbers and context are interesting. Despite multiple challenges, in 1991-92 India stuck to a certain datum level in its responses, ie, one of an orderly shift in the world order as it changed. Therefore, incremental measures against Iraq were supported as they looked to further the cause of removing the threat of war in the middle east. The change in Cambodia away from its brutal past was supported as well. World actions to tackle the genocide in former Yugoslavia was supported too, though India stopped short of endorsing decisive military action. Maybe that was part of India's "growing up" process, maybe it was just too much of a leap of faith in a post-non aligned world. But at the very least, India's stance compared very very favourably indeed to that of China. In terms of presenting a strategic and moral praxis, and sticking to it, it was a record that brings no shame.

In short, India already "belongs" there. Despite the sometimes breathless commentaries on immediate events, the long term trend on India's actions are that of a consistent and emerging international posture, and one that changes too, as times change. India is ready, the question really is, whether the rest of the world is!

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