My piece on the Broadmind blog of Takshashila..
Tuesday, October 11, 2011
Tuesday, October 4, 2011
Indo-Afghan dalliance - new game in town?
The strategic partnership between India and Afghanistan signed today is interesting. At some level, it has the potential to be the new game changer in the centuries old Great Game in Central Asia.
What is new? Well, simply, it is a formal articulation of India's intent of "training, equipping and capacity-building" of Afghan security forces. While the phraseology is sufficiently open-ended ("security forces" can mean the civilian police as well as the army, "capacity building" can stop at usual officer training slots in Indian academies), presumably to preempt any paroxysms of fresh hurt from Pakistan, the intent is clear. India is willing to step up the game on Afghanistan.
There is a feeling, not always unjustified that India's strategy of engagement in Afghanistan has been carried out under the protective umbrella of US/ISAF presence. Barring a few hundred ITBP policemen for proximate security of workers building the Zaranj-Delaram project, India has been loath to put any overt military content to the relationship. In a large measure, it is understandable. Afghanistan's long land border with Pakistan is a reality that is not lost on anyone, and India has been very congnisant of the same. But creative policy-making does not necessarily have to remain hostage to geography.
In many ways, India has been building the blocks. The Chabahar port in Iran, the Zaranj highway are all elements of a potential grand bargain of increasing India's military presence in Afghanistan. With the US likely to be gone by 2014, there will be less sensitivities around using an Iranian route to sustain military presence.
An Indian-run training operation, executed cheaper than the current American effort to train Afghan light infantry, coupled with an aid programme that equips the forces for CI operations - will go a longer way than maintaining a US-style presence.
The agreement yesterday might well be the start of something really good.
What is new? Well, simply, it is a formal articulation of India's intent of "training, equipping and capacity-building" of Afghan security forces. While the phraseology is sufficiently open-ended ("security forces" can mean the civilian police as well as the army, "capacity building" can stop at usual officer training slots in Indian academies), presumably to preempt any paroxysms of fresh hurt from Pakistan, the intent is clear. India is willing to step up the game on Afghanistan.
There is a feeling, not always unjustified that India's strategy of engagement in Afghanistan has been carried out under the protective umbrella of US/ISAF presence. Barring a few hundred ITBP policemen for proximate security of workers building the Zaranj-Delaram project, India has been loath to put any overt military content to the relationship. In a large measure, it is understandable. Afghanistan's long land border with Pakistan is a reality that is not lost on anyone, and India has been very congnisant of the same. But creative policy-making does not necessarily have to remain hostage to geography.
In many ways, India has been building the blocks. The Chabahar port in Iran, the Zaranj highway are all elements of a potential grand bargain of increasing India's military presence in Afghanistan. With the US likely to be gone by 2014, there will be less sensitivities around using an Iranian route to sustain military presence.
An Indian-run training operation, executed cheaper than the current American effort to train Afghan light infantry, coupled with an aid programme that equips the forces for CI operations - will go a longer way than maintaining a US-style presence.
The agreement yesterday might well be the start of something really good.
Friday, September 30, 2011
Pakistan - vindication of India's strategic posture
For long, India's strategic posture towards Pakistan has been described variously as pusilanimous, unimaginative, "soft" - generally, effete. As the Pakistani nation state comes to a pass that uncannily represents MJ Akbar's delightful descriotion of "jelly state", that strategy needs to be evaluated in a newer, better light.
In short, what has been India's own strategic objectives vis a vis Pak? Maintenance of status quo on geography, maintenance of relative "peace" (in terms of no overt hostilities) and minimising cross border terror emanating from there. Measured against each of these objectives, India's stance has paid off big time.
1. Not only has there been absolutely no change in the ground scenario on the geogrophical issue of Kashmir, the level of world support for the "cause" is at its lowest in history. Not even an intifada style uprising last year, or the foolish Ekta Yatra related shenanigans this year could change this reality. The matter has simply vanished from the global political radar, and Pakistan too has been left to make only sporadic belaboured noises.
2. India's military postures, by design or by default (likely to be a combination of both) since Op Parakram has meant that Indo-Pak flashpoint hasnt hobbled investor interest in India. There are lots of other issues with the development paradigm today, but hostilities with Pakistan isnt one. That is a far cry from the '90s, when possibility of Indo-Pak war was a real and present "risk variable" in investor decision making matrices.
3. Cross border terrorism. Using data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, casualties in India due to cross border terror attacks (in Kashmir and jihadi attacks in other parts of India) show a secular decline in the latter half of the last decade. This is including the data from the black swan Mumbai attacks in 2008. We have fresh challenges on home grown terror (especially of the Maoist kind), but a combination of border management and diplomacy (of the normal and coercive types) has meant that the capacities of the Pakistani state to indulge in cross border attacks on India have been dented. Or at least, diverted elsewhere.
As the US is finding out now, Pakistan is a strange challenge from a strategic perspective. Its an abnormal state born out of abnormal conditions, and therefore defy normal policy responses.
India has been only too aware of this. And our policy responses therefore have been trying to address the same issue. A chronically unstable Pakistan, at war with itself and therefore unable to carry out its own strategic agenda with vigour - that is the ideal state for India. Willy nilly, that is exactly what India has ended up achieving.
In short, what has been India's own strategic objectives vis a vis Pak? Maintenance of status quo on geography, maintenance of relative "peace" (in terms of no overt hostilities) and minimising cross border terror emanating from there. Measured against each of these objectives, India's stance has paid off big time.
1. Not only has there been absolutely no change in the ground scenario on the geogrophical issue of Kashmir, the level of world support for the "cause" is at its lowest in history. Not even an intifada style uprising last year, or the foolish Ekta Yatra related shenanigans this year could change this reality. The matter has simply vanished from the global political radar, and Pakistan too has been left to make only sporadic belaboured noises.
2. India's military postures, by design or by default (likely to be a combination of both) since Op Parakram has meant that Indo-Pak flashpoint hasnt hobbled investor interest in India. There are lots of other issues with the development paradigm today, but hostilities with Pakistan isnt one. That is a far cry from the '90s, when possibility of Indo-Pak war was a real and present "risk variable" in investor decision making matrices.
3. Cross border terrorism. Using data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, casualties in India due to cross border terror attacks (in Kashmir and jihadi attacks in other parts of India) show a secular decline in the latter half of the last decade. This is including the data from the black swan Mumbai attacks in 2008. We have fresh challenges on home grown terror (especially of the Maoist kind), but a combination of border management and diplomacy (of the normal and coercive types) has meant that the capacities of the Pakistani state to indulge in cross border attacks on India have been dented. Or at least, diverted elsewhere.
As the US is finding out now, Pakistan is a strange challenge from a strategic perspective. Its an abnormal state born out of abnormal conditions, and therefore defy normal policy responses.
India has been only too aware of this. And our policy responses therefore have been trying to address the same issue. A chronically unstable Pakistan, at war with itself and therefore unable to carry out its own strategic agenda with vigour - that is the ideal state for India. Willy nilly, that is exactly what India has ended up achieving.
Friday, September 16, 2011
Mamata's Bangladesh caper
In the long run, of the many blots on the policy record of UPAII, the one that might end of leaving the deepest scars would be Manmohan Singh's botched Bangladesh visit. What could have been the take-off of a "New Deal" in India's relationship with its near abroad has been left stranded in the runway. More depressingly, the plane awaits clearance from an ATC (aka, Mamata Bannerjee) whose sense of the larger political balance would put BCCI to shame!
The template of India's new deal with Bangladesh had three broad elements:
1. A comprehensive border settlement agreement that dileneates the border and formalises it, finally.
2. A regional transit agreement giving India access to its North East via Bangladesh.
3. A new template of sharing of river waters.
While the promise of the first was kept good, the second became a casualty to Mamata's capers on the third.
The Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh has invested a great deal in the new deal with India. Not just in clamping down on the myriad North EAstern rebel groups operating out of Bangladesh, but also in terms of shifting the entire narrative of the relationship from a typical South Asian "India nasty big brother" syndrome to one of shared economic destinies, taking advantage of India's booming economy. In some ways reflecting the reality of new aspirations that is sweeping many parts of the muslim world, the Hasina government has made economic progress as the key cornerstone of the policy direction, and relationship with India is but a natural corollary.
In such a scenario, Mamata Bannerjee's spanner in the works acts as a huge setback to both Hasina as well as India's cause. It rekindles the old fears of arrogant indifference of India to the radical constituencies in Bangladesh. And prevents the big idea of regional cooperative structures to move ahead for India. Land transit through Bangladesh and access to Chittagong port for trade onwards with East Asia can change the economic destiny of India's North East. Strategically, it affords India a huge insurance against the narrow "chicken's neck" access through Siliguri today.
But for now, the template is stranded on the runway. For many years, India's Sri Lanka policy was hostage to Tamil Nadu regional politics. As a result, China and even Pakistan managed to get significant toe-holds in Sri Lanka, helping it materially in the fight against LTTE. One only wishes that India's Bangladesh policy does not fall at the altar of another mecurial regional heavyweight.
Maybe the PM needs to do more than using Shiv Menon as emissary. Pranab Mukherjee with some Dhakai sarees probably stand a better chance!
The template of India's new deal with Bangladesh had three broad elements:
1. A comprehensive border settlement agreement that dileneates the border and formalises it, finally.
2. A regional transit agreement giving India access to its North East via Bangladesh.
3. A new template of sharing of river waters.
While the promise of the first was kept good, the second became a casualty to Mamata's capers on the third.
The Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh has invested a great deal in the new deal with India. Not just in clamping down on the myriad North EAstern rebel groups operating out of Bangladesh, but also in terms of shifting the entire narrative of the relationship from a typical South Asian "India nasty big brother" syndrome to one of shared economic destinies, taking advantage of India's booming economy. In some ways reflecting the reality of new aspirations that is sweeping many parts of the muslim world, the Hasina government has made economic progress as the key cornerstone of the policy direction, and relationship with India is but a natural corollary.
In such a scenario, Mamata Bannerjee's spanner in the works acts as a huge setback to both Hasina as well as India's cause. It rekindles the old fears of arrogant indifference of India to the radical constituencies in Bangladesh. And prevents the big idea of regional cooperative structures to move ahead for India. Land transit through Bangladesh and access to Chittagong port for trade onwards with East Asia can change the economic destiny of India's North East. Strategically, it affords India a huge insurance against the narrow "chicken's neck" access through Siliguri today.
But for now, the template is stranded on the runway. For many years, India's Sri Lanka policy was hostage to Tamil Nadu regional politics. As a result, China and even Pakistan managed to get significant toe-holds in Sri Lanka, helping it materially in the fight against LTTE. One only wishes that India's Bangladesh policy does not fall at the altar of another mecurial regional heavyweight.
Maybe the PM needs to do more than using Shiv Menon as emissary. Pranab Mukherjee with some Dhakai sarees probably stand a better chance!
Wednesday, August 31, 2011
New banking licenses norms - good, bad or less good?
The long awaited draft guidelines on new banking licenses have been issued by RBI now.
On surface it is an interesting effort to balance the business rationale (of alowing corporates into banking) with the governance imperatives (of preventing conflict of interest situations).
Apparently, the leading contenders for the new licenses (the number has not been divulged yet by RBI) are M&M, L&T, SREI, AV Birla Nuvo. It would be interesting to see the final list of licensees!
On surface it is an interesting effort to balance the business rationale (of alowing corporates into banking) with the governance imperatives (of preventing conflict of interest situations).
Apparently, the leading contenders for the new licenses (the number has not been divulged yet by RBI) are M&M, L&T, SREI, AV Birla Nuvo. It would be interesting to see the final list of licensees!
Monday, August 29, 2011
Indo-Bangladesh relations - time for a new begining
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be in Dhaka for a 2 day visit on Sep 6, and commentators on both sides are optimistic. There is a range of issues that are on the plate, as columnist Haroon Habib says in The Hindu today..
Importantly, for a govt bruised by its mishandling of the Anna Hazare issue, and widely perceived to have become lame duck prematurely, this presents a great opportunity to display energy in policy initiatives.
The big bang policy initiative would really be to resolve the enclaves issue, once and for all. It would involve a small notional (not real) loss of territory to India, but would end a needless issue once and for all.
The other big bang, if the govt shows imagination, would be to start work on a work permit system for Bangladeshi workers in India. In one stroke, it would create a vested interest in Bangladesh for a legal structure, as opposed to the tacit accpetance of illegal immigration today. As the experience with all states sharing borders with less prosperous countries show, economic immigration is almost impossible to stop through physical barriers. The best outcome is to manage the flows through creation of cooperative structures..
If the above is still some distance away in terms of imagination, what is clearly on the agenda is the larger issue of transit. By expanding the issue from a simple Indian access to its North East via Bangladesh to one of regional connectivity, encompassing Bhutan and Nepal, credit goes to Bangladesh and Sheikh Hasina for showing imaginative leadership. A larger regional cooperative structure establishes many more nodes of political support, expands the game, and importantly, diminishes the virulence of opposition from parties in Bangladesh that react impulsively to any Indian deal.
The PM would do well to address the fundamental point there though. In the last 2 decades, India's Bangladesh policy has been hostage to who is in power there. Given that Sheikh Hasina isnt on the throne for life, it is mighty important for us to build bridges across the spectrum. This visit would as good a time as any to start the process.
Importantly, for a govt bruised by its mishandling of the Anna Hazare issue, and widely perceived to have become lame duck prematurely, this presents a great opportunity to display energy in policy initiatives.
The big bang policy initiative would really be to resolve the enclaves issue, once and for all. It would involve a small notional (not real) loss of territory to India, but would end a needless issue once and for all.
The other big bang, if the govt shows imagination, would be to start work on a work permit system for Bangladeshi workers in India. In one stroke, it would create a vested interest in Bangladesh for a legal structure, as opposed to the tacit accpetance of illegal immigration today. As the experience with all states sharing borders with less prosperous countries show, economic immigration is almost impossible to stop through physical barriers. The best outcome is to manage the flows through creation of cooperative structures..
If the above is still some distance away in terms of imagination, what is clearly on the agenda is the larger issue of transit. By expanding the issue from a simple Indian access to its North East via Bangladesh to one of regional connectivity, encompassing Bhutan and Nepal, credit goes to Bangladesh and Sheikh Hasina for showing imaginative leadership. A larger regional cooperative structure establishes many more nodes of political support, expands the game, and importantly, diminishes the virulence of opposition from parties in Bangladesh that react impulsively to any Indian deal.
The PM would do well to address the fundamental point there though. In the last 2 decades, India's Bangladesh policy has been hostage to who is in power there. Given that Sheikh Hasina isnt on the throne for life, it is mighty important for us to build bridges across the spectrum. This visit would as good a time as any to start the process.
Friday, August 26, 2011
Emerging new economic dimension to Afghan policy
In the brouhaha over Anna Hazare, the mainstream media seems to have missed this very interesting development on Afghanistan. An Indian consortium of PSUs and private secotr companies presented a final bid for the enormous Hajigak mines in Afghanistan's Bamyan province. The consortium is led by SAIL, and has 3 PSU and 3 pvt sector companies. Importantly, the Foreign Ministry is taking keen interest in the affair, with the new Foreign Secretary, Ranjan Mathai, taking personal interest in pushing the deal through.
This represents a marked shift in India's Afghan policy, which has been hitherto primarily predicated on a large aid programme, and a somewhat diffident political agenda (of balancing Pak influence). If the Hajigak bid is successful, it will mark the start of the building of a strong economic and a qualitatively different strategic content to India's approach in Afghanistan.
The economic content of the deal is self explanatory, the strategic content is co-terminus.
To start with, the iron ore from Hajigak can only be evacuated through the Chabahaar port in ran. India spent a lot of money and patience in building the Zaranj-Delaram highway,hoping to use that as a crucial linkage to Chabahaar, the only route to India (from Af) that doesnt pass through Pakistan. While some infrastructure has been created, the route has been used sparingly. This deal, if successful, will mean that we would need to use it substantively. Ergo, relations with Iran need to be rescued from the confusion that it has fallen into in the last few years.
Second, while Bamyan is a relatively "peaceful" area, the project would stick out like a large, juicy target to every Taliban/terrorist-type in Afghanistan. Its vulnerability will increase manifold when the US starts drawing down troops from there. We would therefore need to deploy significantly larger numbers of troops there (not the diffident effort of a few hundred ITBP policemen that we have till now) for physical security of the project. Which in itself would entail sorting out a supply chain, maybe through the same Chabahaar route, but also through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) currently used by NATO as an alternative to its Pakistan routes. NDN traverses through Russia and Central Asia, and given that the logistics lines are "oiled", our efforts would be more political (in taping the principals up) rather than infrastructural (as in Chabahaar). Which in turn would require a very different quality of engagement with Central Asia.
Afghanistan is Great Game territory, but today, the game needs substantive economic narratives. Its good that we are waking up to it, but are we prepared to play?
This represents a marked shift in India's Afghan policy, which has been hitherto primarily predicated on a large aid programme, and a somewhat diffident political agenda (of balancing Pak influence). If the Hajigak bid is successful, it will mark the start of the building of a strong economic and a qualitatively different strategic content to India's approach in Afghanistan.
The economic content of the deal is self explanatory, the strategic content is co-terminus.
To start with, the iron ore from Hajigak can only be evacuated through the Chabahaar port in ran. India spent a lot of money and patience in building the Zaranj-Delaram highway,hoping to use that as a crucial linkage to Chabahaar, the only route to India (from Af) that doesnt pass through Pakistan. While some infrastructure has been created, the route has been used sparingly. This deal, if successful, will mean that we would need to use it substantively. Ergo, relations with Iran need to be rescued from the confusion that it has fallen into in the last few years.
Second, while Bamyan is a relatively "peaceful" area, the project would stick out like a large, juicy target to every Taliban/terrorist-type in Afghanistan. Its vulnerability will increase manifold when the US starts drawing down troops from there. We would therefore need to deploy significantly larger numbers of troops there (not the diffident effort of a few hundred ITBP policemen that we have till now) for physical security of the project. Which in itself would entail sorting out a supply chain, maybe through the same Chabahaar route, but also through the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) currently used by NATO as an alternative to its Pakistan routes. NDN traverses through Russia and Central Asia, and given that the logistics lines are "oiled", our efforts would be more political (in taping the principals up) rather than infrastructural (as in Chabahaar). Which in turn would require a very different quality of engagement with Central Asia.
Afghanistan is Great Game territory, but today, the game needs substantive economic narratives. Its good that we are waking up to it, but are we prepared to play?
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