This was published in the Economic Times dated 20th Nov, 2017
In India’s argumentative ideas space, no news is good news.
Therefore, the kerfuffle over the upgrade of India’s sovereign ratings by
Moody’s (to Baa2, from Baa3) is entirely expected. For the partisan, it is a
definitive validation of the government’s economic management. To naysayers, it
is at best empty optics at a time when the economy is slowing down, at worst
highly suspect on timing and credibility. Curiously, both miss essential woods
for trivial plants.
First, the basic point – credit ratings, like most ratings,
are predominantly an evaluation of the past, even though the objective is to
provide guidance for the future. An upgrade is typically rare, especially so
after the global financial crisis in 2008. It takes years of evaluation of
policies (primarily related to macro-stability – debt-levels, sustainability of
public finances, stability etc) before rating upgrades are done. In this case,
the upgrade is especially creditable as it comes barely four years since India
was classified as one of the “fragile five” economies, struggling with high twin
deficits in fiscal and current accounts. To that extent, the current government
deserves a lot of credit – it has privileged macro-stability over growth from
its first day. It started with its first Budget, when the Finance Minister
stuck with the deficit target set by his predecessor, a number that was
received with much scepticism when it was presented by P Chidambaram. Since
then, government has been a dogged “fiscal fundamentalist”, refusing any
slippages even as growth plunged in the recent quarters. On the external
account, a combination of luck (declining oil prices) and pluck (RBI ignoring
shrill calls for massive reduction in interest rates), has kept the situation
on an even keel.
Second, in many ways, this upgrade is merely a partial
correction of a historical anomaly. Baa3, the toe-end of investment grade,
clubs India with a bunch of countries with far worse macro-indicators. It’s a
point that has been made repeatedly by Indian policymakers, most notably by
Chief Economic Advisor Arvind Subramaniam in a section in the last Economic
Survey. India’s structural strengths, eg, public debt entirely funded via rupee
loans, all but a small part via local savings – were seemingly ignored while
benchmarking on headline numbers.
Third, and most important point, is one of future signaling.
What does it mean for India’s economic prospects going forward?
To start with, the sovereign rating is an estimation of the
sovereign’s ability to repay its loans. An upgrade, technically, lowers the
cost of borrowing for the sovereign. This is of limited practical utility to
India, as the Indian government does not fund its deficits via offshore
commercial bond markets. The entire public debt of India is funded via the
domestic Rupee (INR) bond market, and foreign investor participation there is
very small, and tightly regulated through quotas.
Sovereign rating also serves as a benchmark for corporate
entities domiciled in that country, as corporate ratings are (barring very
exceptional cases) capped at the sovereign rating of the home-country of the
corporate. Soon after the sovereign upgrade, Moody’s upgraded a bunch of Indian
corporate entities (largely public sector companies). Over time, this has an
impact on corporate ratings down the chain as well. While not automatic with a
sovereign upgrade, a higher sovereign rating opens up fresh space for corporate
upgrades too. This would result in reduction in cost of borrowing for Indian
companies looking to raise financing from offshore bond markets.
Most important though is the optical macroeconomic signal. A
ratings upgrade gives out a positive narrative on policy and builds incremental
confidence in foreign investors. There are material benefits of the same, eg,
in terms of incremental foreign investment pools from global Pension and Life
Insurance firms that have minimum ratings criteria for investing. Typically,
such incremental flows would tend to bid up Indian bond prices (both onshore
and offshore) – we have already seen the first signs of the same in the form of
dropping yields on government bonds. Higher bond prices, or lower yields, would
tend to lower cost of funds – marginal for the government, but significant for
corporate sector. Incrementally higher foreign flows tend to bid up INR too,
making investments in a host of other Indian financial assets – equities, Real
Estate – incrementally more attractive to foreign investors. It is especially
propitious time for Public Sector Banks (PSB), that would find it easier to
raise capital as part of the recapitalization plan announced earlier this month
(PSB are expected to tap public markets to raise nearly 60,000 crores as a part
of this plan). Lastly, as a net importer, a higher INR flows through as lower
inflation into the economy, as imported goods become cheaper.
This isn’t an unmixed blessing. High levels of foreign flows
resulting in rapid currency appreciation can result in loss of export
competitiveness, with adverse consequences. South Korea’s meltdown in 1997-98
was at least partially due to a similar situation, barely a couple of years
after it received a sovereign ratings upgrade.
In a nutshell, a ratings upgrade isn’t a major climax, nor
is it much ado about nothing. It is a positive milestone, and quibbling about
the size of the same is essentially narcissism of minor differences. But it is
merely one milestone in India’s development journey, where there are miles to
go before we can even think of dozing off!
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