The new Army Chief, Gen Bipin Joshi set the proverbial cat among the pigeons when he made a clear, unambiguous reference to Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) as a live war strategy option against Pakistan. It led to a flurry of "deja vu" responses - from Pakistan and the Indian (and global) commentariat. From Pakistan, the usual "we will nuke India with tactical weapons" narrative was trotted out. Given the frequency with which Pakistani politicians (and military) make nuclear threats, the marginal concern about a new one is rather low. More interesting though was the response of the global strategic commentariat. In a series of newspaper columns, analysts Vipin Narang, Walter Ladwig, George Perkovich (and many others) addressed (or referred to) Cold Start. The general view was the same, and can be encapsulated in the following points:
1. Indian military doesnt have the required capacity to carry out CSD.
2. Indian tanks lack nightfighting equipment, artillery hasnt seen any new induction for 30 years, IAF has 33 squadrons of fighters against a projected 42, Indian submarine programme is running decades late.
3. The higher defence organisation envisaged in CSD (formation of 8 IBG - Integrated Battle Groups) hasnt been affected. Nor has the long pending reforms around Chief of Defence Staff seen any great traction.
In a nutshell, neither in equipment nor in doctrinal/structural developments is the Indian Army in a position to execute CSD. Given that it gives Pakistan the excuse to trot out destabilising Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) it is a futile exercise to refer to it.
Unfortunately, the commentariat has got it wrong, completely. Born out of the experience of the ponderous (and hence ultimately fruitless) mobilisation of Indian Army's Strike Corps during Op Parakram, Cold Start effectively has 3 broad objectives:
One, mobilise a sizeable assault force in quick time (4-5 days) around 1/2 sectors along the International Boundary with Pakistan.
Two, establish local superiority in these sectors by concentrating disproportionate firepower with the assault force.
Three, execute a quick shallow strike along those sectors - "salami slice" enough territory in those sectors to get a time/space advantage over Pakistan, before the international pressure bears down on both countries to cease operations.
A close reading of developments over the last 15 years (since Op Parakram, 2002) shows that there has been steady, perhaps slow, but definite movement towards building up capabilities to execute the limited objectives envisaged under CSD. Lets take a look at some of them.
Force accretion and placement
From 4 RAPIDS (Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division) - a lightly mechanised/armoured division - in 2002, the Army now has 6 RAPIDs. Of them, 3 of them have been placed (some moved) close to the International Border (in Jodhpur, Kota and Bikaner). These 3 formations form the nuclei of rapid reaction forces near the IB.
A third artillery division, 42 Artillery Division, was raised under SWC in 2008-09. Comprising of both tube and rocket artillery (given the lack of tube artillery acquisition in the last 15 years, this means a conscious strategy of concentrating existing firepower in frontline deployed formations). Further, this new division was also moved to Bassi near Jaipur (from Alwar), closer to the International Border, in 2012. Such a massive concentration of firepower prepositioned near the IB enables high volume fire support at short notice to any quick operation across the border.
Defensive formations (known as Holding Corps) near the IB have been equipped with more mechanised, armour and air defence resources. For example, Jalandhar-based 11 Corps now has mobile SA8/6 SAM systems, transferred from the strike corps (that are being equipped with Akash SAM systems). Such "beefing up" of defensive formations enable them support assault units better by plugging sector-specific gaps in armour/air defence/artillery.
A very large part of the chopper fleet today is night-flying enabled (all Mi17V and ALH-Dhruv can fly at night). As is the renewed transport fleet comprising of C17/C130 planes. All of which enables quick mobilisation of troops at launchpads near the border.
Airbase modernisation has been concentrated around forward air bases. The first IAF base with a fully underground hangars is Uttarlai, near Barmer.
Structural changes to operations
The jargon used often are "manoevre warfare", "air land" battles. Most of the Indian Army's division (and corps) level exercises in the last 15 years have practised exactly these concepts. From Ex Divya Astra to Ex Shatrujeet, various IA formations have practised mobilising fast, manoevering in integrated air-land battle formations and operating under an NBC umbrella.
In Ex Sudarshan Shakti (2011), the Army publicly explained how it is honing its operations. Instead of static formations with limited number of mechanised/armour assets, the Army now prepares for all formations pooling in assets to smaller assault forces leading an offensive.
Threat of nuclear weapons - managing the escalation
Barring the point on Indian "incapabilities", the big bugbear on CSD is the Pakistani threat of using Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) in such a scenario. Besides the bizarre prospect of a country threatening to nuke its own territory (after all, the Indian armoured columns would be inside Pak if CSD was activated), the Indian Army trains and equips extensively for it. Most frontline tank units are equipped with NBC suites. Mechanised units too are being equipped with them now. Most exercises involve a nuclear umbrella as a default operational scenario.
In a nutshell, the higher defence management in India as well as military capability in India have a lot to be desired. the gaps are many. However, this doesnt mean that limited objectives like the sort envisaged under CSD are way outside the realm of India's capabilities. A military modernised by the sheer weight of 15 years of spectacular economic growth will have something to show for it at the end (against an adversary that has barely staved off bankruptcy in the same period). Crucially, many empirical evidence (some of which explained above) suggest that the Indian military has been preparing for CSD with intent and purpose, and its not just a "war plan on paper".
In an information age where narrative matters in determining national security outcomes (no better instance than Kargil as an instance), it is important that the narrative around Indian capabilities breaks out of the "cannot do anything" paradigm!
1. Indian military doesnt have the required capacity to carry out CSD.
2. Indian tanks lack nightfighting equipment, artillery hasnt seen any new induction for 30 years, IAF has 33 squadrons of fighters against a projected 42, Indian submarine programme is running decades late.
3. The higher defence organisation envisaged in CSD (formation of 8 IBG - Integrated Battle Groups) hasnt been affected. Nor has the long pending reforms around Chief of Defence Staff seen any great traction.
In a nutshell, neither in equipment nor in doctrinal/structural developments is the Indian Army in a position to execute CSD. Given that it gives Pakistan the excuse to trot out destabilising Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) it is a futile exercise to refer to it.
Unfortunately, the commentariat has got it wrong, completely. Born out of the experience of the ponderous (and hence ultimately fruitless) mobilisation of Indian Army's Strike Corps during Op Parakram, Cold Start effectively has 3 broad objectives:
One, mobilise a sizeable assault force in quick time (4-5 days) around 1/2 sectors along the International Boundary with Pakistan.
Two, establish local superiority in these sectors by concentrating disproportionate firepower with the assault force.
Three, execute a quick shallow strike along those sectors - "salami slice" enough territory in those sectors to get a time/space advantage over Pakistan, before the international pressure bears down on both countries to cease operations.
A close reading of developments over the last 15 years (since Op Parakram, 2002) shows that there has been steady, perhaps slow, but definite movement towards building up capabilities to execute the limited objectives envisaged under CSD. Lets take a look at some of them.
Force accretion and placement
From 4 RAPIDS (Reorganised Army Plains Infantry Division) - a lightly mechanised/armoured division - in 2002, the Army now has 6 RAPIDs. Of them, 3 of them have been placed (some moved) close to the International Border (in Jodhpur, Kota and Bikaner). These 3 formations form the nuclei of rapid reaction forces near the IB.
A third artillery division, 42 Artillery Division, was raised under SWC in 2008-09. Comprising of both tube and rocket artillery (given the lack of tube artillery acquisition in the last 15 years, this means a conscious strategy of concentrating existing firepower in frontline deployed formations). Further, this new division was also moved to Bassi near Jaipur (from Alwar), closer to the International Border, in 2012. Such a massive concentration of firepower prepositioned near the IB enables high volume fire support at short notice to any quick operation across the border.
Defensive formations (known as Holding Corps) near the IB have been equipped with more mechanised, armour and air defence resources. For example, Jalandhar-based 11 Corps now has mobile SA8/6 SAM systems, transferred from the strike corps (that are being equipped with Akash SAM systems). Such "beefing up" of defensive formations enable them support assault units better by plugging sector-specific gaps in armour/air defence/artillery.
A very large part of the chopper fleet today is night-flying enabled (all Mi17V and ALH-Dhruv can fly at night). As is the renewed transport fleet comprising of C17/C130 planes. All of which enables quick mobilisation of troops at launchpads near the border.
Airbase modernisation has been concentrated around forward air bases. The first IAF base with a fully underground hangars is Uttarlai, near Barmer.
Structural changes to operations
The jargon used often are "manoevre warfare", "air land" battles. Most of the Indian Army's division (and corps) level exercises in the last 15 years have practised exactly these concepts. From Ex Divya Astra to Ex Shatrujeet, various IA formations have practised mobilising fast, manoevering in integrated air-land battle formations and operating under an NBC umbrella.
In Ex Sudarshan Shakti (2011), the Army publicly explained how it is honing its operations. Instead of static formations with limited number of mechanised/armour assets, the Army now prepares for all formations pooling in assets to smaller assault forces leading an offensive.
The “theatre concept” that army headquarters is trying out is intended to shake the chain of command out of its ennui. Over the years, largely because of a paucity of resources, commands were reluctant to part with their assets to favour units that were not directly under them.
Now, they are being asked to put all assets on the ground to assist the head of an assault force. This will demand a seamless flow, and probably a merger, of logistics branches — like the Army Service Corps — with the strike elements (like the strike corps) and also better co-ordination between commands.
Threat of nuclear weapons - managing the escalation
Barring the point on Indian "incapabilities", the big bugbear on CSD is the Pakistani threat of using Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) in such a scenario. Besides the bizarre prospect of a country threatening to nuke its own territory (after all, the Indian armoured columns would be inside Pak if CSD was activated), the Indian Army trains and equips extensively for it. Most frontline tank units are equipped with NBC suites. Mechanised units too are being equipped with them now. Most exercises involve a nuclear umbrella as a default operational scenario.
Arrayed against this is a Pakistani Army involved in the deadly Zarb-e-Azb operation against TTP and other islamist groups in FATA/Balochistan, as well as raising new units to protect the CPEC project being executed.
In a nutshell, the higher defence management in India as well as military capability in India have a lot to be desired. the gaps are many. However, this doesnt mean that limited objectives like the sort envisaged under CSD are way outside the realm of India's capabilities. A military modernised by the sheer weight of 15 years of spectacular economic growth will have something to show for it at the end (against an adversary that has barely staved off bankruptcy in the same period). Crucially, many empirical evidence (some of which explained above) suggest that the Indian military has been preparing for CSD with intent and purpose, and its not just a "war plan on paper".
In an information age where narrative matters in determining national security outcomes (no better instance than Kargil as an instance), it is important that the narrative around Indian capabilities breaks out of the "cannot do anything" paradigm!
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