Arcane nuclear alphabet soups are back in media fashion. For once, with good reason, as India has mounted a high profile, energetic campaign to get membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the informal club of 48 countries that regulates global nuclear trade through regime of voluntary compliance to agreed rules.
In a way, membership of NSG (as well as of the other 3 groups - MTCR, Australia Group and Wassenar Group) would mark the culmination of the process of India's de jure admission into the global nuclear order, a process that started with the India-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement (famously known as the 123 Agreement) and the "clean waiver" from NSG in 2008.
From available indications, China is the standout objector to India's entry, insisting on a process for Pakistan's admission as a proxy to block India's admission to NSG (all decisions in NSG are through consensus, ie, every member has a veto). Drumming up support for India's cause was a key theme running across PM Modi's 5-country tour recently.
The amount of diplomatic energy spent on this effort is puzzling though. Lets study some of the facts on the ground.
In 2008, India received what is now popularly known as a "clean waiver" from NSG. Technically NSG, in an extraordinary plenary meeting, adopted a Statement of Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India, which outlined a set of rules/guidelines enabling all member countries to engage in trade of civilian nuclear technology and materials with India. Under the arrangement, in exchange for bringing a substantial number of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, India could trade in nuclear material and technology "legally" with all member countries, and access all technologies that an NSG member-country would have access to.
Now NSG guidelines are voluntary, and technically member-countries can (and often have) enter into contracts outside the same. Most notably, Russian supply of fuel for Tarapur in 2001, contracts for Kudunkulum 1/2, Chinese supply of reactors to Pakistan (Chashma 1/2) are instances of that. But of course these deals are exceptional in nature, and cant be a template for a scalable civilian nuclear business. The "clean waiver" in 2008 enabled exactly that for India.
Soon after, India entered into agreements with dozens of countries for supply of nuclear fuel/tech - from Kazakhstan to Canada to Australia. The results have been dramatic, and Plant Load Factors of Indian nuclear power plants have increased significantly as Indian nuclear power plants have had "free" access to imported Uranium.
There hasnt been any major movement on new imported reactors though, but that has been primarily on account of the Indian Civil nuclear liability law, a legislation (borne out of Parliamentary pressure brought in by a coalition of the Left and BJP) that scared away pretty much all major nuclear operators in the world.
In 2011, there was a minor flutter when the NSG adopted new guidelines on trade in sensitive Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technologies, restricting it to NPT members. It was widely feared that this annulled India's "clean waiver". However, French, American and Russian interlocutors (main potential sources of ENR tech) clarified that India's waiver isnt impacted by the new rules, and India would continue to have access to ENR technology if we so intended to. Big point though is, the Indian nuclear scientific community isnt in any hurry to tap into imported ENR tech as a priority.
Ergo, since 2008, India has derived all commercial benefits of an NSG member-country, without actually being a member. Ergo, the question really arises, why the brouhaha today on membership? The proponents generally postulate three main benefits of having a seat at the table.
One, as an insurance policy. By becoming a member, India will have a voice at the table. NSG would not be able to take decisions that adversely impact India without our consent. The fear is overblown. As mentioned earlier, NSG works on consensus, ie, every member has a veto. Given India's heft in international politics and trade, it would be a black swan scenario to have 48 member nations unite on guidelines that adversely impact India. As India's trade in nuclear reactors is kicked off, there would be commercial handcuffs with major powers (US, France) that would act as bigger and better insurance policies.
Two, it enables India shape the global nuclear/disarmament architecture. This is the ostensible objective with perhaps the least synchronicity with India's strategic posture. At the cornerstone of the global nuclear architecture is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Given the discriminatory nature of NPT (India cannot join as a Nuclear Weapon State), India's deliberate approach has been towards creating strategic space for itself through exceptionalism rather than shaping the global rules per se. The NSG clean waiver fits nicely in that framework. Given the near dogmatic status of NPT, membership of adjunct voluntary "clubs" like NSG affords very little opportunity to shape the global order.
Three and last (also the least), it gives India a seat at the "high table". "India's rightful place in the comity of nations" has been a freedom movement paradigm. Implicit in the objective has been membership of global rule-making platforms - permanent membership of UN Security Council, G20, Bretton Woods institutions, global Trade blocs. The issue though is, NSG is neither a proper table (its voluntary), nor is it particularly high (48 member countries, including Argentina, Mexico and Austria among others). It represents multilateral democracy at its zenith (each member having a veto), and consequently is least amenable to great power deal-making that is essentially based upon exceptionalism and vested interests.
Net net, while membership of NSG is a worthy goal, there isnt a big material win" at stake for India, over and above what we already have. The outcomes of membership are likely to be rather more banal than what the breathless commentary seems to suggest!
In a way, membership of NSG (as well as of the other 3 groups - MTCR, Australia Group and Wassenar Group) would mark the culmination of the process of India's de jure admission into the global nuclear order, a process that started with the India-US Civilian Nuclear Agreement (famously known as the 123 Agreement) and the "clean waiver" from NSG in 2008.
From available indications, China is the standout objector to India's entry, insisting on a process for Pakistan's admission as a proxy to block India's admission to NSG (all decisions in NSG are through consensus, ie, every member has a veto). Drumming up support for India's cause was a key theme running across PM Modi's 5-country tour recently.
The amount of diplomatic energy spent on this effort is puzzling though. Lets study some of the facts on the ground.
In 2008, India received what is now popularly known as a "clean waiver" from NSG. Technically NSG, in an extraordinary plenary meeting, adopted a Statement of Civil Nuclear Cooperation with India, which outlined a set of rules/guidelines enabling all member countries to engage in trade of civilian nuclear technology and materials with India. Under the arrangement, in exchange for bringing a substantial number of nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, India could trade in nuclear material and technology "legally" with all member countries, and access all technologies that an NSG member-country would have access to.
Now NSG guidelines are voluntary, and technically member-countries can (and often have) enter into contracts outside the same. Most notably, Russian supply of fuel for Tarapur in 2001, contracts for Kudunkulum 1/2, Chinese supply of reactors to Pakistan (Chashma 1/2) are instances of that. But of course these deals are exceptional in nature, and cant be a template for a scalable civilian nuclear business. The "clean waiver" in 2008 enabled exactly that for India.
Soon after, India entered into agreements with dozens of countries for supply of nuclear fuel/tech - from Kazakhstan to Canada to Australia. The results have been dramatic, and Plant Load Factors of Indian nuclear power plants have increased significantly as Indian nuclear power plants have had "free" access to imported Uranium.
There hasnt been any major movement on new imported reactors though, but that has been primarily on account of the Indian Civil nuclear liability law, a legislation (borne out of Parliamentary pressure brought in by a coalition of the Left and BJP) that scared away pretty much all major nuclear operators in the world.
In 2011, there was a minor flutter when the NSG adopted new guidelines on trade in sensitive Enrichment and Reprocessing (ENR) technologies, restricting it to NPT members. It was widely feared that this annulled India's "clean waiver". However, French, American and Russian interlocutors (main potential sources of ENR tech) clarified that India's waiver isnt impacted by the new rules, and India would continue to have access to ENR technology if we so intended to. Big point though is, the Indian nuclear scientific community isnt in any hurry to tap into imported ENR tech as a priority.
Ergo, since 2008, India has derived all commercial benefits of an NSG member-country, without actually being a member. Ergo, the question really arises, why the brouhaha today on membership? The proponents generally postulate three main benefits of having a seat at the table.
One, as an insurance policy. By becoming a member, India will have a voice at the table. NSG would not be able to take decisions that adversely impact India without our consent. The fear is overblown. As mentioned earlier, NSG works on consensus, ie, every member has a veto. Given India's heft in international politics and trade, it would be a black swan scenario to have 48 member nations unite on guidelines that adversely impact India. As India's trade in nuclear reactors is kicked off, there would be commercial handcuffs with major powers (US, France) that would act as bigger and better insurance policies.
Two, it enables India shape the global nuclear/disarmament architecture. This is the ostensible objective with perhaps the least synchronicity with India's strategic posture. At the cornerstone of the global nuclear architecture is the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Given the discriminatory nature of NPT (India cannot join as a Nuclear Weapon State), India's deliberate approach has been towards creating strategic space for itself through exceptionalism rather than shaping the global rules per se. The NSG clean waiver fits nicely in that framework. Given the near dogmatic status of NPT, membership of adjunct voluntary "clubs" like NSG affords very little opportunity to shape the global order.
Three and last (also the least), it gives India a seat at the "high table". "India's rightful place in the comity of nations" has been a freedom movement paradigm. Implicit in the objective has been membership of global rule-making platforms - permanent membership of UN Security Council, G20, Bretton Woods institutions, global Trade blocs. The issue though is, NSG is neither a proper table (its voluntary), nor is it particularly high (48 member countries, including Argentina, Mexico and Austria among others). It represents multilateral democracy at its zenith (each member having a veto), and consequently is least amenable to great power deal-making that is essentially based upon exceptionalism and vested interests.
Net net, while membership of NSG is a worthy goal, there isnt a big material win" at stake for India, over and above what we already have. The outcomes of membership are likely to be rather more banal than what the breathless commentary seems to suggest!
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