Friday, January 8, 2016

Pathankot - operational win, narrative defeat?

The country has been seized of the audacious terror strike on IAF's Pathankot base for the last few days. The general media (and "expert") analyses seems to be converging around describing the operation as a disaster, with the consensus view being that this is as much of a fiasco operationally (though not in terms of casualties) as Mumbai 26/11.

As an armchair enthusiast, I find the above conclusion a bit puzzling. First up, what would have been the objectives of the folks that planned and executed this fidayeen attack?

1. Spring a surprise attack on a high profile military target to highlight India's vulnerabilities to such jihadi assaults.
2. Destroy aircraft and military assets, if possible.
3. Take hostages to prolong the operation and inflict large casualties, both military and civilian.
4. Perhaps most importantly, capture the media narrative.

So from the perspective of the jihadi groups, how did the outcomes stack up?

1. The attack wasnt a surprise, there was advance intelligence, and forces were waiting for them (even if the specific target wasnt known).
2. No military asset was destroyed. Indeed, IAF aircraft from the air base made repeated sorties in support of the operation. In other words the offensive capacity of the airbase was maintained while the terror attack was on.
3. No hostages were taken, no civilians were killed. Military casualties were high, and something that perhaps could have been minimised.
4. This was the success. The attack and its aftermath has surely captured the media narrative, and shaped it in the direction that the jihadis would have liked.

Tactically therefore, how was the operation a "failure", given that we denied the jihadis most of the desired tactical objectives? It would be interesting to compare this with a very similar incident, where an airbase was attacked with pretty much similar objectives. This was the Taliban attack on Camp Bastion. Camp Bastion is one of the largest coalition logistics and offensive air support base in Afghanistan, situated in the frontier Helmand province. During the attack, it housed a fleet of US Marine Corps (USMC) Harrier fighter aircraft, besides transport aircraft and choppers. Brief summary of the attack in the link below.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_2012_Camp_Bastion_raid

In short, the attack managed to destroy or damage 9 aircraft, including 8 Harrier fighters. While military casualties were low (2 killed), the tactical success for the Taliban was huge. And this despite the fact that Bastion, unlike Pathankot was not a family station, and hence housed only combat and support troops (not large numbers of civilians that slow down operations and increase risk of casualties).

While intelligence on an impending attack was much less specific for Bastion than it was for Pathankot, it was a military base in a combat zone (and hence always expecting to be attacked and therefore on hair trigger alert all the time).

It seems where we have lost out is on the media narrative. Seems as if we have managed to achieve in the media for the jihadis that they couldnt in the attack itself. The focus of the media narrative has been on blaming NSA, caviling over choice of forces (NSG versus Army) etc. Its important to control the media narrative in asymmetric conflict, and we seem to have a long way to go. Not just for the government, but for us collectively as a society.

9 comments:

  1. We were lucky, my dear!! Despite an adequate warning, we were found with our pants down! Read Gen Panaag's views!

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  2. Doval controlling the ops when u have 50000 tps there? Micro mgmnt by the top! Stupid! GOC 29 shd have been i/c.

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  3. Ajoy

    Doesn't matter who's in charge. IG NSG is ex GOC 26 div,is he less capable of leading a CT team?

    Terrorists are evolving in their tactics,forces need to as well. That includes using flexible C2.

    NSG was a great pre emotive idea. If there was a hostage situation,people would have said NSG was delayed.

    All in all,there seems to be more heart burn at army troops having to report to the head of a paramil force than anything substantial.

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  4. I just came across your piece and have to disagree with you on the issue:
    1. NSG is only tailored to carry out intervention and rescue operations. Moving them closer was a good idea but expecting them to stop the terrorists was wrong. They didn't have the tactical training or equipment for that. This is despite the fact that personnel of NSG involved were from the Army and quite a few may have been from the Parachute Regiment.
    2. A Staff Officer cannot command a tactical operation. He may have the expertise but he certainly doesn't have the mandate or the staff support required. No army does it and that is why we have Commanders at various levels.In fact the NSG should only have taken over the situation if a hostage situation had arisen.
    3.The reason behind placing the NSG in command was so that the NSA could micro-manage.
    4. Not a question of Army being unhappy, the fact is the Air Force Base Commander should have been in charge, it was his base and he knew it best.In any case all terrorist were killed by Army personnel once Army teams were brought in.
    5. It was a tactical goof up because of total casualties we suffered and the manner it was conducted.
    6. Please see my analysis http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/guts-and-glory-all-that-went-wrong-with-the-panthankot-operation/

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  5. Brigadier

    Just saw your comment.just a couple of points:

    1. If there was a hostage situation and NSG wasn't present,folks would have cribbed that preemptive action wasn't taken.

    2. The point on NSG "training" is a huge red herring IMHO.All SAG troopers have many more years of line infantry experience than they have NSG experience.do they suddenly develop amnesia the moment they don the black dungarees from their olive greens?

    There is a lot of speculative stuff around NSA trying to micromanage the situation. For all his real and imagined faults,Ajit Doval is a seasoned CT /Intel professional. To insinuate that he isn't aware of 101 principles is stretching it too far.

    About the command of the ops,my ltd point is on the quibbling over the uniform. Folks advocating that GOC 29 div would have been more suitable forget that IG NSG was GOC 26 Div till a few months back. Again,colour of the uniform doesn't change competence does it? As for the AF base commander,obviously there were gaps in his leadership. Which is why we see the recent changes there.

    Last,compare Pthankot with PNS Mehran,the SL airbase attack,and above all Camp Bastion. The last was a frontline base engaged in combat,guarded by elite Marines and RAF regiment (Garud are inspired from that concept). Compare the outcomes with Pathankot.
    I would say we did a jolly good job!

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  7. Gr8 analysis Mr.Som.
    A lot of ppl Hv been advocating use of Para SF under such situations rather than taking help of NSG. Ur thots?

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  8. I alluded to that in the post. The SAG team consists of army personnel on deputation,many of them from Para SF. So really it's not a question of NSG bad Para good in this scenario.

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  9. I alluded to that in the post. The SAG team consists of army personnel on deputation,many of them from Para SF. So really it's not a question of NSG bad Para good in this scenario.

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