India-China Border Dispute – the Real Issue is Tibet

This was published in the China-India Brief of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (National University of Singapore)

http://lkyspp.nus.edu.sg/cag/publication/china-india-brief/china-india-brief-46

China, along with the US and Pakistan, have traditionally been the largest files handled by any Indian Prime Minister on the foreign policy front. The Modi government has set out on an interesting dynamic. On one hand there are substantive discussions with China on trade and investments (including on one of Modi’s pet projects, High Speed Railway). On the other hand, the government has broken from the past by sending out clear signals on countering Chinese influence in Asia. Modi’s statement on “expansionist powers” in Japan, the Indo-US joint statement on South China Sea, resurrection of the India-US-Japan-Australia maritime exercises – the messaging from India has been quite loud.

While a certain amount of the Indo-China equation is driven by their recent history and rising power and status, the biggest irritant in the Indo-Chinese equation has been the border issue. While the border has been tranquil for a long time (the last “hot” activity was in 1986, in the Sundorong Chu area), the disputed nature of the boundary lends itself to periodic media frenzy over “incursions”. The two sides have been engaged in border resolution talks for many years now, but progress has been painfully slow. Recently Ajit Doval, the National Security Advisor was appointed as the Special Representative (SR) of India in the Indo-China talks on the boundary question. By itself, the development was largely routine – India’s Special Representative has traditionally been the NSA over the last decade and a half. But the announcement brought into sharp relief the longstanding nature of the dispute.

Despite a formal dispute resolution mechanism, and the fact that the two countries are headed by men of formidable political clout, progress on the border has been slow. From available accounts, the sticking points are largely to do with Chinese claims on Indian “red lines” (eg, a demand to cede the Tawang tract) rather than the other way round. The Indian side has been keen on a “give and take” compromise around status quo positions, not least because each Indian government has been subjected to enormous domestic media pressure around the incursions by Chinese troops. At times these have been ill-timed with high profile visits (the latest one during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India). This is something that all Indian governments have been keen to avoid at least in part so as to get on with economic interactions with China.

However, besides competing claims around the MacMahon line, the elephant in the room is something else – Tibet. In fact for China, the key issue is all about Tibet. While China has outstanding border/boundary disputes with all its neighbours (much like India), very few are the existentialist nature of Tibet (the other being Taiwan). Despite successive Indian governments assuring China of India’s official recognition of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, Chinese fears around India’s “Tibet card” emanates out of multiple prongs – political, religious/philosophical and military.

First, the presence of the Dalai Lama, along with a full-fledged and well developed government-in-exile in India. While the government-in-exile represents little by the way of military influence, the seat of power and the persona of Dalai Lama together exert enormous moral and political influence around the world. The Chinese did not fail to notice that Narendra Modi invited Lobsang Sangay, the Prime Minister of the Tibetan government-in-exile, for his swearing-in ceremony. India’s sponsorship of his seat and the enormous social goodwill and influence of the Dalai Lama in India’s state and civil society stand in sharp relief to how global leaders keep an hands-off distance from His Holiness in deference to Chinese sentiments.

Second, the strategic importance of Tawang. Tawang is the second highest seat of Tibetan Mahayana Buddhism, and the monastery there exercises enormous moral/philosophical influence over Tibetans. Indian “occupation” of the tract and monastery means that the Chinese perceive a philosophical “chicken’s neck” for the Chinese occupation of Tibet. This influence isn’t restricted to Tawang alone. The traditional influence (both spiritual and temporal) of Tibet’s historic monasteries  (Drepung, Ganden, etc), which have been desecrated/destroyed by the Chinese, is now to be found in similar Tibetan establishments around India.

Third, while Tibet has been largely peaceful in the public eye, small and big bushfires continue flaring up every now and then. Every time there is a flare-up, there are mirroring reactions in India, within the large Tibetan community as well as civil society, panned widely by India’s loud and free media.

Fourth, India maintains a large force of Tibetan exiles under the operational command of the Indian Army, the Special Frontier Force (SFF). The SFF, staffed largely from among the Tibetan exiles living in India and led by Indian Army officers, was set up soon after the Indo-China war in 1962, with initial help from the CIA. Over the years, the force (also known as the Vikas Regiment) has developed into a fine fighting force, having participated in multiple military campaigns in Bangladesh (1971) and Kargil (1998), as well as counter insurgency operations in J&K and North East. SFF has grown in importance and prestige over the years and is typically led by a senior Indian Army officer (the current Army Chief, Gen Dalbir Singh Suhag being one). The presence of this large, professional fighting force is a red rag to the Chinese, akin to an armed Tibetan fifth column in India.

In short, the Chinese have a deep fear of a strong Tibet card in Indian hands. Any settlement of the border dispute is actually predicated on the Indian government visibly d eliminating the various elements of this card. Unfortunately, India is unlikely to oblige beyond what it has already done, that is, affirm Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. Anything else would invite a tremendous backlash from both voters and the strategic community in India.

Which is why Ajit Doval (and his Chinese counterpart, Yang Jiechi) have an unenviable task – that of going through the motions without really getting to the crux of the issue!