One of the prime foreign policy objectives in recent years for India has been that of a permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In a marked deviation from the usual ad hocism that bedevils policy in India, the quest for UNSC has been a multi-decadal, focused initiative. So much so that Barack Obama had to make public "commitments" (of sorts) of support in order to make his India visit a "success".
The question often asked of India though, including by the US President during his visit, is whether India is ready to sit on the high table? Is India prepared to make tough policy choices, rather than sitting on the sidelines and focus on the rhetoric rather than the hard politics?
There are no easy answers to the question, but one approach that has not been studied too carefully perhaps is India's track record as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. How has India voted? Have we remained on the sidelines on the burning issues of the day? Or have we stuck to a single-minded focus on India's strategic interests? Indeed, how has our stand been in contrast to the other great Asian nation state, China, during the same periods?
A study of India's two latest stints in UNSC, 2011-12 and 1991-92, throws up some interesting conclusions.
2011-12
In India's latest stint in UNSC, the council presented a divided stance on 6 occasions, 5 if one excludes the resolution on non-proliferation by Iran which was carried unanimously save Lebanon which abstained. These 5 resolutions involved issues that spanned a wide swathe of geopolitical challenges - from Syria to Somalia to Libya to Israel. India's stance in most of these cases were congruent with the "Western" school, even as the West came to be increasingly confronted by an increasingly assertive China.
On the question of Syria, India made its case clearly, even if seemingly hesitantly in favour of the "spring" there, voting with the US/West once while abstaining on another occasion, while China (and Russia) vetoed the resolution on both occasions.
On Somalia, despite India's large and increasing economic engagement in Africa, India was quite clear in siding with the Western world in asking the Somalian leadership for greater accountability in protecting its citizens. This, in the face of China, India's main competitor for economic influence in Africa, abstaining (along with Russia).
It was only on questions related to Libya that India made common cause with the BRIC bloc, and abstained when Europe (supported by the US) wanted to push for a more aggressive intervention there.
India's stance on Israeli settlements in Jerusalem was a clear Yes, along with the rest of the world, barring the US which maintained its traditional veto on matters relating to Israel.
In a nutshell, out of 6 resolutions in UNSC that presented a divided vote, India took a clear position in 4 out of them, while abstaining in 2. China on the other hand, abstained on 2 occasions as well, while using its veto clearly on the Syrian issue twice. Beyond the bare numbers, the principles used are key. India went ahead and made a stance on larger principles on both Syria and Somalia, while China interventions were purely in line with commercial interests in both cases.
1991-92
But somewhat more interesting to analyse would be India's engagements in its previous stint in UNSC, in 1991-92. Unlike an identified emerging giant today, the early '90s were traumatic for the republic in many ways. The economy was in tatters, buffeted by the socialist excesses coming to roost. On the other hand, the previously cosy strategic praxis was rudely shaken up by the break-up of the Soviet Union and loud proclamations of the "End of History" in favour of the Americans. To top it all, India's big strategic achilis heel, Kashmir, erupted in a bloody insurgency.
At the same time, the challenges confronting the world were interestingly new - break up of traditional political unities in Europe, overturning of the communist regimes in Asia and Africa, post Gulf War I rumblings in the Middle East. And many of these involved political dispensations with traditional friendly linkages with India.
First the numbers. Out of 12 resolutions that divided the UNSC, India abstained in 4. In contrast, China abstained in 8. On issues relating to Cambodia and Iraq, India was firmly behind the World consensus, while China refused to take a stance. Even on the developments in Bosnia, India went along with the humanitarian imperatives most of the time, abstaining only on mandates basically authorising military force. It is only on sanctions against Libya that India baulked completely, and abstained from being part of the move.
The numbers and context are interesting. Despite multiple challenges, in 1991-92 India stuck to a certain datum level in its responses, ie, one of an orderly shift in the world order as it changed. Therefore, incremental measures against Iraq were supported as they looked to further the cause of removing the threat of war in the middle east. The change in Cambodia away from its brutal past was supported as well. World actions to tackle the genocide in former Yugoslavia was supported too, though India stopped short of endorsing decisive military action. Maybe that was part of India's "growing up" process, maybe it was just too much of a leap of faith in a post-non aligned world. But at the very least, India's stance compared very very favourably indeed to that of China. In terms of presenting a strategic and moral praxis, and sticking to it, it was a record that brings no shame.
In short, India already "belongs" there. Despite the sometimes breathless commentaries on immediate events, the long term trend on India's actions are that of a consistent and emerging international posture, and one that changes too, as times change. India is ready, the question really is, whether the rest of the world is!
Tuesday, February 28, 2012
Thursday, February 16, 2012
The Iran conundrum – Indian choices predicated on the wrong premise?
There has been the usual flurry of commentary from the commentariat in the latest round of tension around Iran. Not incorrectly, much of it has been focused on how India cannot be sitting on the sidelines, as it were anymore. It is when the analyses dive a little deeper do the nasty little nuances show up, angularities that dont fit the narrative. There are fundamentally two reasons quoted why India needs to maintain equanimity with Iran:
1. India imports 12 million tons of crude oil from that country.2. Presence of a large Indian diaspora in the region and the remittances from there.
Problem is, the first issue is hardly one of any great import. Oil is a global commodity, and prices are determined globally. Iran isnt the only country producing crude, and absence of Iranian supplies does not make either US or Western Europe, both larger consumers of crude than India, particularly oil-distressed. India therefore, should be able to replace its Iranian supplies with alternate sources relatively easily. Especially with the Saudis being ever so eager to make those deals.
The second, on the other hand is even more “interesting”. Bulk of the Indian diaspora in the Middle East is concentrated in the GCC region. Iran on the other hand, has very few Indian expats and contributes very little indeed to remittances. And countries that bring up the forefront of the global wariness on Iran are not US, or even Israel. The GCC bloc, led by the Saudis have the highest axes to grind and are working doubly hard in back channels to mobilise support for isloating Iran in world capitals. Again, if India are to be pursuing “self interest” single mindedly, we should be ideally be cutting deals with the Saudis!
Surprisingly, there is a third, and in many ways, the most important angle that very few have focussed on. Which is the fact that Iran constitutes the pivot of India’s Afghan strategy. For all the years of Taliban rule, Iran was the geographic praxis for India to retain its influence in the region. The Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, built by India, is part of the larger Indo-Afghan route whose first leg is Indian access to the Chabahaar port in Iran. With the Americans scheduled to leave sooner rather than later, the Iranian geography would be nearly irreplaceable for India to retain strategic options.
In short, are India’s options really that “Hobson”-ian? Or is there a case of Iran needing friends, or at least neutrals more than India’s strategic imperatives? Imaginatively thought through, given India’s equity with Israel as well as with the Saudis, is there space for India to emerge as a mediator? Cant we tell Iran that while we are happy to keep half a foot outside the Western-GCC axis, there has to be a price to be paid for that? There was a time when India actively sought to “mediate”, whether in Korea or in Indo-China. Then it was primarily about our “moral heft”, an equity that had rapidly diminishing returns. Today, as a major strategic partner for all parties involved, and without the suspicions that China almost congenitally evokes in most capitals, India’s options are more.
This is the time to create new options, not lament the lack of them!
1. India imports 12 million tons of crude oil from that country.2. Presence of a large Indian diaspora in the region and the remittances from there.
Problem is, the first issue is hardly one of any great import. Oil is a global commodity, and prices are determined globally. Iran isnt the only country producing crude, and absence of Iranian supplies does not make either US or Western Europe, both larger consumers of crude than India, particularly oil-distressed. India therefore, should be able to replace its Iranian supplies with alternate sources relatively easily. Especially with the Saudis being ever so eager to make those deals.
The second, on the other hand is even more “interesting”. Bulk of the Indian diaspora in the Middle East is concentrated in the GCC region. Iran on the other hand, has very few Indian expats and contributes very little indeed to remittances. And countries that bring up the forefront of the global wariness on Iran are not US, or even Israel. The GCC bloc, led by the Saudis have the highest axes to grind and are working doubly hard in back channels to mobilise support for isloating Iran in world capitals. Again, if India are to be pursuing “self interest” single mindedly, we should be ideally be cutting deals with the Saudis!
Surprisingly, there is a third, and in many ways, the most important angle that very few have focussed on. Which is the fact that Iran constitutes the pivot of India’s Afghan strategy. For all the years of Taliban rule, Iran was the geographic praxis for India to retain its influence in the region. The Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, built by India, is part of the larger Indo-Afghan route whose first leg is Indian access to the Chabahaar port in Iran. With the Americans scheduled to leave sooner rather than later, the Iranian geography would be nearly irreplaceable for India to retain strategic options.
In short, are India’s options really that “Hobson”-ian? Or is there a case of Iran needing friends, or at least neutrals more than India’s strategic imperatives? Imaginatively thought through, given India’s equity with Israel as well as with the Saudis, is there space for India to emerge as a mediator? Cant we tell Iran that while we are happy to keep half a foot outside the Western-GCC axis, there has to be a price to be paid for that? There was a time when India actively sought to “mediate”, whether in Korea or in Indo-China. Then it was primarily about our “moral heft”, an equity that had rapidly diminishing returns. Today, as a major strategic partner for all parties involved, and without the suspicions that China almost congenitally evokes in most capitals, India’s options are more.
This is the time to create new options, not lament the lack of them!
Monday, February 6, 2012
Indo-Bangladesh relations – collateral damage of UPA’s political issues
The editorial today in the Indian Express captures some element of the damage to India’s relations with Bangladesh caused by Mamata Bannerjee’s caper over the Teesta river treaty. What it leaves unsaid is the severe damage to India’s neighbourhood outreach strategy in general this has done.
Its somewhat ironic that Indian governments have been far more capable of defying local political opposition for key foreign policy initiatives farther ashore than for those concerning our immediate neighbours. Succcessive governments, both Congress and BJP, defied opposition in Kerala to the FTA with Thailand. On the other hand, India’s Sri Lanka policy has been held hostage to Tamil Nadu politics for the last two decades.
Manmohan Singh made his policy on South Asia a lynchpin of his foreign policy paradigm. No other leg of the initiative got as much of a “leg up” as Bangladesh when Sheikh Hasina came to power. The new outreach of the Bangladeshi government to India came as a welcome ballast to Indian efforts to build a new cooperative architecture with Bangladesh. Bangladesh shed years of a “sulking neighbour” attitude to openly embrace a new relationship, starting with the rounding up of North Eastern insurgents enjoying sanctuary there. India reciprocated, first during the BDR revolt, and then again during the attempted coup of retired and serving Army officers against the Hasina government.
But the big idea is still missing. Congress’s weakness at the Centre and Mamata Bannerjee’s attempt to carve out a different (regional) niche for herself has made the big idea of Bangladesh policy hostage to West Bengal politics.
Given the state of Centre’s influence over allies and policymaking currently, one can only hope that better wisdom dawns upon Mamata and this doesnt become an encore of India’s Sri Lanka policy and enable China to deepen its access and influence in this important neighbour of India.
Its somewhat ironic that Indian governments have been far more capable of defying local political opposition for key foreign policy initiatives farther ashore than for those concerning our immediate neighbours. Succcessive governments, both Congress and BJP, defied opposition in Kerala to the FTA with Thailand. On the other hand, India’s Sri Lanka policy has been held hostage to Tamil Nadu politics for the last two decades.
Manmohan Singh made his policy on South Asia a lynchpin of his foreign policy paradigm. No other leg of the initiative got as much of a “leg up” as Bangladesh when Sheikh Hasina came to power. The new outreach of the Bangladeshi government to India came as a welcome ballast to Indian efforts to build a new cooperative architecture with Bangladesh. Bangladesh shed years of a “sulking neighbour” attitude to openly embrace a new relationship, starting with the rounding up of North Eastern insurgents enjoying sanctuary there. India reciprocated, first during the BDR revolt, and then again during the attempted coup of retired and serving Army officers against the Hasina government.
But the big idea is still missing. Congress’s weakness at the Centre and Mamata Bannerjee’s attempt to carve out a different (regional) niche for herself has made the big idea of Bangladesh policy hostage to West Bengal politics.
Given the state of Centre’s influence over allies and policymaking currently, one can only hope that better wisdom dawns upon Mamata and this doesnt become an encore of India’s Sri Lanka policy and enable China to deepen its access and influence in this important neighbour of India.
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