A newer, more frightening reality of Assam?

In the entire debate of whether the Assam riots are an ethnic issue, a communal one or indeed an insider-foreigner clash, an extremely important point has gotten missed out in the narrative. In the last 7-10 days, we have had (muslim) mobs vandalising police and media in Mumbai, the Buddha statue in Lucknow, and carrying out (relatviely) minor violent demonstrations in many other parts. All of them protesting Assam and Burma(!), weaving them inside a larger narrative of muslim grievances.



It has put paid to almost all narratives - from BJP's "foreigner" thesis to the nuanced secular "complex Assamese identities" treatise. The overwhelming narrative that gets crystallised is frightening. Its about the reality of "pan Islamism". India has seen that over many issues - periodic Shia displays of angst over US policies on Iran, or the virulence displayed over the Danish cartoons recently - but these have been sporadic and episodic. But the latest round of violence has displayed, chillingly, that on certain issues, the ummah prevails over the local community and worse, even an "Indian" identity.



So the Buddha statue in Lucknow is fair game because there are (real or imagined is besides teh point) Rohingya muslim grievance against Burmese buddhists.



This, rather than quibbles over who is Indian and who isnt, is the worrying point.

Non Alignment 2.0

A new study in an attempt to discern "strategic" patterns in Indian policy making..

http://www.cprindia.org/sites/default/files/NonAlignment%202.0_1.pdf

UNSC - India already belongs?

One of the prime foreign policy objectives in recent years for India has been that of a permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In a marked deviation from the usual ad hocism that bedevils policy in India, the quest for UNSC has been a multi-decadal, focused initiative. So much so that Barack Obama had to make public "commitments" (of sorts) of support in order to make his India visit a "success".


The question often asked of India though, including by the US President during his visit, is whether India is ready to sit on the high table? Is India prepared to make tough policy choices, rather than sitting on the sidelines and focus on the rhetoric rather than the hard politics?


There are no easy answers to the question, but one approach that has not been studied too carefully perhaps is India's track record as a non-permanent member of the UNSC. How has India voted? Have we remained on the sidelines on the burning issues of the day? Or have we stuck to a single-minded focus on India's strategic interests? Indeed, how has our stand been in contrast to the other great Asian nation state, China, during the same periods?


A study of India's two latest stints in UNSC, 2011-12 and 1991-92, throws up some interesting conclusions.


2011-12
In India's latest stint in UNSC, the council presented a divided stance on 6 occasions, 5 if one excludes the resolution on non-proliferation by Iran which was carried unanimously save Lebanon which abstained. These 5 resolutions involved issues that spanned a wide swathe of geopolitical challenges - from Syria to Somalia to Libya to Israel. India's stance in most of these cases were congruent with the "Western" school, even as the West came to be increasingly confronted by an increasingly assertive China.

On the question of Syria, India made its case clearly, even if seemingly hesitantly in favour of the "spring" there, voting with the US/West once while abstaining on another occasion, while China (and Russia) vetoed the resolution on both occasions.

On Somalia, despite India's large and increasing economic engagement in Africa, India was quite clear in siding with the Western world in asking the Somalian leadership for greater accountability in protecting its citizens. This, in the face of China, India's main competitor for economic influence in Africa, abstaining (along with Russia).

It was only on questions related to Libya that India made common cause with the BRIC bloc, and abstained when Europe (supported by the US) wanted to push for a more aggressive intervention there.

India's stance on Israeli settlements in Jerusalem was a clear Yes, along with the rest of the world, barring the US which maintained its traditional veto on matters relating to Israel.

In a nutshell, out of 6 resolutions in UNSC that presented a divided vote, India took a clear position in 4 out of them, while abstaining in 2. China on the other hand, abstained on 2 occasions as well, while using its veto clearly on the Syrian issue twice. Beyond the bare numbers, the principles used are key. India went ahead and made a stance on larger principles on both Syria and Somalia, while China interventions were purely in line with commercial interests in both cases.

1991-92
But somewhat more interesting to analyse would be India's engagements in its previous stint in UNSC, in 1991-92. Unlike an identified emerging giant today, the early '90s were traumatic for the republic in many ways. The economy was in tatters, buffeted by the socialist excesses coming to roost. On the other hand, the previously cosy strategic praxis was rudely shaken up by the break-up of the Soviet Union and loud proclamations of the "End of History" in favour of the Americans. To top it all, India's big strategic achilis heel, Kashmir, erupted in a bloody insurgency.

At the same time, the challenges confronting the world were interestingly new - break up of traditional political unities in Europe, overturning of the communist regimes in Asia and Africa, post Gulf War I rumblings in the Middle East. And many of these involved political dispensations with traditional friendly linkages with India.

First the numbers. Out of 12 resolutions that divided the UNSC, India abstained in 4. In contrast, China abstained in 8. On issues relating to Cambodia and Iraq, India was firmly behind the World consensus, while China refused to take a stance. Even on the developments in Bosnia, India went along with the humanitarian imperatives most of the time, abstaining only on mandates basically authorising military force. It is only on sanctions against Libya that India baulked completely, and abstained from being part of the move.

The numbers and context are interesting. Despite multiple challenges, in 1991-92 India stuck to a certain datum level in its responses, ie, one of an orderly shift in the world order as it changed. Therefore, incremental measures against Iraq were supported as they looked to further the cause of removing the threat of war in the middle east. The change in Cambodia away from its brutal past was supported as well. World actions to tackle the genocide in former Yugoslavia was supported too, though India stopped short of endorsing decisive military action. Maybe that was part of India's "growing up" process, maybe it was just too much of a leap of faith in a post-non aligned world. But at the very least, India's stance compared very very favourably indeed to that of China. In terms of presenting a strategic and moral praxis, and sticking to it, it was a record that brings no shame.

In short, India already "belongs" there. Despite the sometimes breathless commentaries on immediate events, the long term trend on India's actions are that of a consistent and emerging international posture, and one that changes too, as times change. India is ready, the question really is, whether the rest of the world is!

The Iran conundrum – Indian choices predicated on the wrong premise?

There has been the usual flurry of commentary from the commentariat in the latest round of tension around Iran. Not incorrectly, much of it has been focused on how India cannot be sitting on the sidelines, as it were anymore. It is when the analyses dive a little deeper do the nasty little nuances show up, angularities that dont fit the narrative. There are fundamentally two reasons quoted why India needs to maintain equanimity with Iran:
1. India imports 12 million tons of crude oil from that country.2. Presence of a large Indian diaspora in the region and the remittances from there.
Problem is, the first issue is hardly one of any great import. Oil is a global commodity, and prices are determined globally. Iran isnt the only country producing crude, and absence of Iranian supplies does not make either US or Western Europe, both larger consumers of crude than India, particularly oil-distressed. India therefore, should be able to replace its Iranian supplies with alternate sources relatively easily. Especially with the Saudis being ever so eager to make those deals.
The second, on the other hand is even more “interesting”. Bulk of the Indian diaspora in the Middle East is concentrated in the GCC region. Iran on the other hand, has very few Indian expats and contributes very little indeed to remittances. And countries that bring up the forefront of the global wariness on Iran are not US, or even Israel. The GCC bloc, led by the Saudis have the highest axes to grind and are working doubly hard in back channels to mobilise support for isloating Iran in world capitals. Again, if India are to be pursuing “self interest” single mindedly, we should be ideally be cutting deals with the Saudis!
Surprisingly, there is a third, and in many ways, the most important angle that very few have focussed on. Which is the fact that Iran constitutes the pivot of India’s Afghan strategy. For all the years of Taliban rule, Iran was the geographic praxis for India to retain its influence in the region. The Zaranj-Delaram highway in Afghanistan, built by India, is part of the larger Indo-Afghan route whose first leg is Indian access to the Chabahaar port in Iran. With the Americans scheduled to leave sooner rather than later, the Iranian geography would be nearly irreplaceable for India to retain strategic options.
In short, are India’s options really that “Hobson”-ian? Or is there a case of Iran needing friends, or at least neutrals more than India’s strategic imperatives? Imaginatively thought through, given India’s equity with Israel as well as with the Saudis, is there space for India to emerge as a mediator? Cant we tell Iran that while we are happy to keep half a foot outside the Western-GCC axis, there has to be a price to be paid for that? There was a time when India actively sought to “mediate”, whether in Korea or in Indo-China. Then it was primarily about our “moral heft”, an equity that had rapidly diminishing returns. Today, as a major strategic partner for all parties involved, and without the suspicions that China almost congenitally evokes in most capitals, India’s options are more.
This is the time to create new options, not lament the lack of them!

Indo-Bangladesh relations – collateral damage of UPA’s political issues

The editorial today in the Indian Express captures some element of the damage to India’s relations with Bangladesh caused by Mamata Bannerjee’s caper over the Teesta river treaty. What it leaves unsaid is the severe damage to India’s neighbourhood outreach strategy in general this has done.
Its somewhat ironic that Indian governments have been far more capable of defying local political opposition for key foreign policy initiatives farther ashore than for those concerning our immediate neighbours. Succcessive governments, both Congress and BJP, defied opposition in Kerala to the FTA with Thailand. On the other hand, India’s Sri Lanka policy has been held hostage to Tamil Nadu politics for the last two decades.
Manmohan Singh made his policy on South Asia a lynchpin of his foreign policy paradigm. No other leg of the initiative got as much of a “leg up” as Bangladesh when Sheikh Hasina came to power. The new outreach of the Bangladeshi government to India came as a welcome ballast to Indian efforts to build a new cooperative architecture with Bangladesh. Bangladesh shed years of a “sulking neighbour” attitude to openly embrace a new relationship, starting with the rounding up of North Eastern insurgents enjoying sanctuary there. India reciprocated, first during the BDR revolt, and then again during the attempted coup of retired and serving Army officers against the Hasina government.
But the big idea is still missing. Congress’s weakness at the Centre and Mamata Bannerjee’s attempt to carve out a different (regional) niche for herself has made the big idea of Bangladesh policy hostage to West Bengal politics.
Given the state of Centre’s influence over allies and policymaking currently, one can only hope that better wisdom dawns upon Mamata and this doesnt become an encore of India’s Sri Lanka policy and enable China to deepen its access and influence in this important neighbour of India.

20 years of Indo-Israeli relations – a rare policy bright spot?

For a government that has been (rightly) pilloried for policy paralysis, the celebration of 20 years of establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel is a rare occasion for the UPAII to claim a degree of coherence in policymaking.
First up, and perhaps most encouragingly, there has been no squeamishness in "celebrating" the occasion. The Foreign Minister is in Tel Aviv for the occasion, a slew of deals are being signed during his visit, an FTA is under negotiation. In short, the whole nine yeards. The optics are clear for everyone to see (and draw conclusions from).
Second, it follows through on a "Look West" policy initiative that has relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Israel as its cornerstones.
For Israel, the occasion comes at a time when its social-strategic compact with the rest of the Middle East is undergoing a fundamental shift. Its traditional ally, Turkey, has increasingly taken a position sharply antagonistic, primarily on account of the ruling AKP's aspiration to reinvent Turkey as the primary "tilt" power in the larger muslim and Arab world. The various "springs" in the larger Arab world on the other hand - from Egypt to Bahrain to Syria, bring nervous portends for Israel. Shorn of the rhetoric, Israel had assiduously built a co-existance compact with the Arab street over the decades. The new dispensations taking over from the older autocracies , or those struggling to do the same do not necessarily share with Israel the same covert affinity of fear (of Iran). Nor indeed do the Islamists looking to cut deals in the same manner as Hosni Mubarak or the House of the Saud have been in the past.
At the same time, India has embarked on an ambitious new agenda with the Arab world, primarily woven around economics.
India has historically had a unique position in the Arab world. Not many remember that till the late '60s, the Indian rupee was legal tender in much of the current GCC area. India's support for the Palestinian cause was well in line with the Arab street for a long time. And even the surge in Indo-Israeli relationship has not taken the rhetoric away completely - note that SM Krishna's next after Tel Aviv is going to be Palestine!
While Israel tries to navigate around the emerging Arab world and newer alliances, India can play a unique role in helping the it engage with it afresh. India's in a unique place - its important and credible to Israel in terms of hard dollars, and it is important and credible to the larger Arab world (and Iran, in a delicious twist of potential opportunity!) in terms of hard dollars. There are only two other countries that have the same leverage - US and China. US is not trusted by the Arab street, while the Chinese tango with Israel will always be hamstrung by the large looming reality of US influence within Israel.
This is an opportunity that India cannot miss. By most accounts, it is doing a fair job of it...

Bill Gross and interest rates - and he is wrong!

Bill Gross stands corrected: Markets expected to muddle in unchartered territories in 2012

Last year Bill Gross spelt out his bearish outlook on US treasuries for various reasons and he was under-invested treasuries because they offer no upside.
US 10-year Treasury yield (inverse to Treasury prices) closed below 2% to 1.87% for the first time in history. The 10 yr note prices are up nearly 17%.

(Ironically, in the days after S&P downgraded U.S. creditworthiness, investors flocked to U.S. Treasury bonds, and any further downgrades will continue to result in investors seeking the security of U.S. Treasury bonds. The European sovereign debt crisis, the elephant in the room, although nearly not as bad as the nadir a few months ago, is still a significant problem.)
Bill Gross’s latest (Jan 2012) monthly investment outlook indicates his bullish view on U.S treasury bonds as against his bearish views on US treasuries a year back. PIMCO fund’s underperformance (as compared to peer group) is a reflection of it’s under invested positions in US treasuries.
Durations and average maturities should be at their maximum possible limits” states the letter. So now treasuries have value? With the 10-year note yielding under 2%, and the 5-year below 90bp? Of course the answer PIMCO offers is that longer durations should be in TIPS to protect against inflation. But TIPS yield is now negative, so with a 2% inflation rate, one is roughly at the same yield as with the 10-year note.
Conclusions/learning:
1. Globally markets and economies are treading unchartered waters amidst black swan events like the subprime crisis, sovereign credit crisis & Euro zone crisis.

2. Markets continue to surprise the even the best regarded market analyst/strategist.

Army Chief’s date of birth – much ado masking the real issues

The press, both print and electronic has been abuzz with the date of birth issue over the last couple of weeks. Politicians, never to be expected to let go of opportunities to get into the limelight, have jumped in. On the issue specifically, it is really much ado about little. Disputes over date of birth are par for the course in government services, and happen by the dozens every year at many levels. “Political interference” too is hardly new or unique to this situation – from Nehru’s handling of Gen Thimayya to Indira Gandhi’s supercession of Lt Gens Sinha and Bhagat to Mulayam Singh Yadav’s open interference on blatant caste terms for certain Army commanders – its a reality which hardly needed a caper over the incumbent Chief’s date of birth to unravel. In the present case, all it requires is a bit of common sense on both sides (the good General and the MoD) for the issue to be resolved amicably.
The larger question however is different. Which is of the state of higher management of defence in the country. Nearly 15 years after Kargil, ad hocism mark most decision-making on policy. The K Subramanyam committee recommendations have achieved the status of most “committee” reports in India, ie, be food for termites in a departmental almirah.
Starting from a lack of institution building at the apex level (when was the last meeting of the NSAB?) to continuing interservice quarrels over equipment (latest being the fracas between IAF and IA over ownership of tactical attack choppers), India’s higher level defence management doesnt seem to have changed much since the ’70s!
An integrated service headquarters with MoD is nowhere in the horizon, CDS has not gone beyond intra-service bickerings, and each service arm continues to buy equipment rather than plan for meeting objectives. Importantly, barring some notable exceptions, India continues to try being a military power primarily on imported equipment, the first for any country in recent or distant memory.
In the Indian concepts of “timelessness”, dates are forgotten only too easily. One has only to look at the Kargil lessons to realise this. In that context, the Chief’s date of birth is but a matter of minor detail!