Debka is a mixed bag. Sometimes its wildly sensational, sometimes it surprises with some real "scoops"...This one's intriguing..
www.debka-net-weekly.com/demo.pl?username=
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Monday, June 15, 2009
The "Pak" problem - India's response
While the Obama administration jostles with the AfPak problem, for India the problem has been just a "Pak" one. Our Pakistan policy, more often than not, in fact pretty much all the time in recent years, has alternated between pappi jhappi diplomacy and sullen cussedness. Even our best analysts dont get the point usually..
Here is a perfect case in point.
C Raja Mohan is otherwise one our brightest strategic thinkers. But as this article, pretty much symptomatic of his "line" shows, we dont yet grasp the nub of the issue. And that is the undeniable fact that Pakistan is a problem state that is destined to remain a migraine (in Hillary Clinton's words) for the world. Like all migraines, it can only be "managed", not "cured".
And managing Pakistan is not about bestowing "normality" to our engagement with it, it is about maintaining an "unbalanced equilibrium" for the Pakistani state, at all times. A Pakistan that is relatively "stable" is one that will be prompted to mount the most debilitating adventures, specifiically at India, but generally also at the rest of the world. It was a relatively "stable" Pakistan, one after Ayub Khan's "Golden decade", that launched Ops Gibraltar and Grand Slam. It was a relatively stable Pakistan under Nawaz Sharif that mounted Kargil. It was a relatively stable Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto's second regime that carried out the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. If a stable Pakistan can be such a headache, imagine what a really "strong, prosperous" Pakistan will be tempted to do?
A Pakistan that is constantly fighting its own ghosts, one that is perpetually engaged in an internal "mortal combat", but remaining just off the precipice thanks to global efforts (mostly dollars and some American military "advice") - that is a Pakistan that would be in the least propitious position to mount a serious challenge on India.
A Pakistan in a state of eternal crisis will also mean a defunct and derelict proxy for China in South Asia. It frees up the grand strategic space for India to craft its own vision of the South Asian region and play the Central Asian "great game" without being boxed in by a pretender in South Asia.
The foreign policy near consensus that a "strong and stable Pakistan is in our best interests" is therefore at best woolly sentimentalism and at worst lazy conformance to Western idioms.
The most obvious qustion is, what about terrorism? an unstable Pakistan theoretically can be a more prlific exporter of terrorism than a stable one. First, the assumption is empirically unstable itself. Mumbai notwithstanding, the levels of violence in J&K plummetted by more than half in the last 2-3 years, coinciding with Pakistan's own escalation of the problem. Obviously there is a limit to fighting the Pakistani Taliban on one hand and supporting the LET on the other - even if it makes neat strategic sense, it would be difficult to operatinalise. Second, it was a "stable" Pakistan that created India's biggest insurgency problems, first in Punjab and then in Kashmir. An unstable Pakistani state today is having to pay lip service to countering the same terrorism, and therefore earning the wrath of their own Islamist proxies. Again, the "unbalanced equilibrium" of the Pakistani state ensures less levels of terrorism for India, not more. third, and most importantly, we will best tackle terrorism from Pakistan only when we create a similar problem there. The Punjab insurgency was taken care of when India inflicted similar pain through a first class covert operation of sabotage and bomb blasts within Pakistan. It is to IK Gujral's eternal shame that the covert capabilities of RAW were wound down in his time. It is time for us to ramp up our capabilities of doing a "Kashmir" on Pakistan. More importantly, hit the establishment elites where it hurts most - in the Punjabi heartland.
Last, this whole concept of engaging various sections of the Pakistani society to achieve our goals is quite silly to be precise. Civil societies dont determine state policy, state actors do. In Pakistan, the state actors (the military primarily) are incorrigibly biased against the idea of India, and India's success only fuels fresh imagined grievances. Therefore, the only way to manage them is by managing them to a state of chaos that it is today, not to nudge them towards any level of normality.
Here is a perfect case in point.
C Raja Mohan is otherwise one our brightest strategic thinkers. But as this article, pretty much symptomatic of his "line" shows, we dont yet grasp the nub of the issue. And that is the undeniable fact that Pakistan is a problem state that is destined to remain a migraine (in Hillary Clinton's words) for the world. Like all migraines, it can only be "managed", not "cured".
And managing Pakistan is not about bestowing "normality" to our engagement with it, it is about maintaining an "unbalanced equilibrium" for the Pakistani state, at all times. A Pakistan that is relatively "stable" is one that will be prompted to mount the most debilitating adventures, specifiically at India, but generally also at the rest of the world. It was a relatively "stable" Pakistan, one after Ayub Khan's "Golden decade", that launched Ops Gibraltar and Grand Slam. It was a relatively stable Pakistan under Nawaz Sharif that mounted Kargil. It was a relatively stable Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto's second regime that carried out the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan. If a stable Pakistan can be such a headache, imagine what a really "strong, prosperous" Pakistan will be tempted to do?
A Pakistan that is constantly fighting its own ghosts, one that is perpetually engaged in an internal "mortal combat", but remaining just off the precipice thanks to global efforts (mostly dollars and some American military "advice") - that is a Pakistan that would be in the least propitious position to mount a serious challenge on India.
A Pakistan in a state of eternal crisis will also mean a defunct and derelict proxy for China in South Asia. It frees up the grand strategic space for India to craft its own vision of the South Asian region and play the Central Asian "great game" without being boxed in by a pretender in South Asia.
The foreign policy near consensus that a "strong and stable Pakistan is in our best interests" is therefore at best woolly sentimentalism and at worst lazy conformance to Western idioms.
The most obvious qustion is, what about terrorism? an unstable Pakistan theoretically can be a more prlific exporter of terrorism than a stable one. First, the assumption is empirically unstable itself. Mumbai notwithstanding, the levels of violence in J&K plummetted by more than half in the last 2-3 years, coinciding with Pakistan's own escalation of the problem. Obviously there is a limit to fighting the Pakistani Taliban on one hand and supporting the LET on the other - even if it makes neat strategic sense, it would be difficult to operatinalise. Second, it was a "stable" Pakistan that created India's biggest insurgency problems, first in Punjab and then in Kashmir. An unstable Pakistani state today is having to pay lip service to countering the same terrorism, and therefore earning the wrath of their own Islamist proxies. Again, the "unbalanced equilibrium" of the Pakistani state ensures less levels of terrorism for India, not more. third, and most importantly, we will best tackle terrorism from Pakistan only when we create a similar problem there. The Punjab insurgency was taken care of when India inflicted similar pain through a first class covert operation of sabotage and bomb blasts within Pakistan. It is to IK Gujral's eternal shame that the covert capabilities of RAW were wound down in his time. It is time for us to ramp up our capabilities of doing a "Kashmir" on Pakistan. More importantly, hit the establishment elites where it hurts most - in the Punjabi heartland.
Last, this whole concept of engaging various sections of the Pakistani society to achieve our goals is quite silly to be precise. Civil societies dont determine state policy, state actors do. In Pakistan, the state actors (the military primarily) are incorrigibly biased against the idea of India, and India's success only fuels fresh imagined grievances. Therefore, the only way to manage them is by managing them to a state of chaos that it is today, not to nudge them towards any level of normality.
Sunday, June 14, 2009
Officer shortage in the Indian Army - barking up the wrong trees
Both the BJP as well as the Congress agree on the OROP for ex-servicemen. And the topic has motivated not just passionate dharnas (!) by ex servicemen, but also serving and ex-service chiefs to to wade into the debate...
OROP is presented as the panacea for all ills afflicting the defence forces, especially the problem of the 24% officer shortage.
It seems OROP, along with increasing the numbers of general staff officers (colonels, brigadiers, generals of all stars and bars!) will motivate more youth to join the services. The latter has been done - the AV Singh Committee report has been accepted in toto...As a result, the Indian Army will probably have more general staff officers than the US military! Already, all infantry battalions are commanded by Colonels (compared to Lt cols earlier and in other armies), all fighter squadrons by Wing Cos, many ships by Commodores...With this, the trend will only hasten the "greying" of the officer profile...
The fact is that both OROP, as well as a few hundred more general staff posts are not going to ameliorate the fundamental issue - attracting the youth of today in a competitive job market towards a career in the services....Given the state of the budget though (alredy about 17-18% of the Union Budget goes towards defence, and this does not include defence pension), so the scope for simply attracting more by increasing salaries is limited.A better option would be for an exapnded, restructured SSC cadre, with golden handshakes after 5 years. The idea would be to have a leaner Permanent Cadre (PC), and an expanded SSC to take care of the numbers shortage...Economicaly, some very rough broad level analysis..
The expanded SSC-leaner PC model has the following sources of "cost saves" that can be used to increase the benefits for the PC corps:
1. Lower overall pension bill
2. Lower benefits and other infrastructure costs, as many of this is for the benefit of the PC corps only
3. Lower "numbers" of PC offiicers @ Col rank and above
We have only minimal data available, so a very exhaustive analysis is a bit tricky, but an attempt to gauge the potential through an estimation of the first point only (pension bills).
total pension bill of the services: 15244 crores (Source: Union Budget 2008-09)
Officer Corps as a % of total personnel: (about 3.1% estimated) (Source: about 40k officers out of 1.3 Million personnel)
% of pension accruing to the officer corps: estimated @ 7.5% (slightly more than doubel their contribution of nos)
Total officer pension bill: 1143 crores
Current serving officer-to-pensioner ration: 1.68 - taken at the same level as the serving personnel to pensioner ratio (source)
Equilibrium state serving officer-to-pensioner ratio: 1 (estimating a steady state ration of 60% SSC corps officers)
total no of PC officers: 16000 (40% of total officer corps)
% decline in officer pension commitment: 40%
Pension savings: 463 crores
Incremental available/PC officer: 2.9 lacs (approx)
This is a very crude approximation, based on available numbers on one count. There will be other savings (and expenses) of carrying out this exercise. But an incremental pool available of 3 lacs per officer, based on CURRENT COSTS (extending this into the future, which is when the steady state will come about, will yield much bigger numbers), is not a bad start!
OROP is presented as the panacea for all ills afflicting the defence forces, especially the problem of the 24% officer shortage.
It seems OROP, along with increasing the numbers of general staff officers (colonels, brigadiers, generals of all stars and bars!) will motivate more youth to join the services. The latter has been done - the AV Singh Committee report has been accepted in toto...As a result, the Indian Army will probably have more general staff officers than the US military! Already, all infantry battalions are commanded by Colonels (compared to Lt cols earlier and in other armies), all fighter squadrons by Wing Cos, many ships by Commodores...With this, the trend will only hasten the "greying" of the officer profile...
The fact is that both OROP, as well as a few hundred more general staff posts are not going to ameliorate the fundamental issue - attracting the youth of today in a competitive job market towards a career in the services....Given the state of the budget though (alredy about 17-18% of the Union Budget goes towards defence, and this does not include defence pension), so the scope for simply attracting more by increasing salaries is limited.A better option would be for an exapnded, restructured SSC cadre, with golden handshakes after 5 years. The idea would be to have a leaner Permanent Cadre (PC), and an expanded SSC to take care of the numbers shortage...Economicaly, some very rough broad level analysis..
The expanded SSC-leaner PC model has the following sources of "cost saves" that can be used to increase the benefits for the PC corps:
1. Lower overall pension bill
2. Lower benefits and other infrastructure costs, as many of this is for the benefit of the PC corps only
3. Lower "numbers" of PC offiicers @ Col rank and above
We have only minimal data available, so a very exhaustive analysis is a bit tricky, but an attempt to gauge the potential through an estimation of the first point only (pension bills).
total pension bill of the services: 15244 crores (Source: Union Budget 2008-09)
Officer Corps as a % of total personnel: (about 3.1% estimated) (Source: about 40k officers out of 1.3 Million personnel)
% of pension accruing to the officer corps: estimated @ 7.5% (slightly more than doubel their contribution of nos)
Total officer pension bill: 1143 crores
Current serving officer-to-pensioner ration: 1.68 - taken at the same level as the serving personnel to pensioner ratio (source)
Equilibrium state serving officer-to-pensioner ratio: 1 (estimating a steady state ration of 60% SSC corps officers)
total no of PC officers: 16000 (40% of total officer corps)
% decline in officer pension commitment: 40%
Pension savings: 463 crores
Incremental available/PC officer: 2.9 lacs (approx)
This is a very crude approximation, based on available numbers on one count. There will be other savings (and expenses) of carrying out this exercise. But an incremental pool available of 3 lacs per officer, based on CURRENT COSTS (extending this into the future, which is when the steady state will come about, will yield much bigger numbers), is not a bad start!
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